August 1, 2022 Map of changes in Ukraine over the last 100+ days

Flash essays from the collection “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” tell about the insights, experiences, and beliefs of Ukrainians, which ignited their society in 2022, when the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine began.

The Cultural Hub community and curators carefully collected, translated, and illustrated these texts in order to capture the values ​​of Ukrainians — Freedoms, Bravery, Dignity, Responsibility, and Humour. 

A series of publications in partnership with Chytomo introduces this collection to the English-speaking audience. Volume 25 continues to present the series. You can get acquainted with the previous collection here.

This document has been jointly elaborated by the participants of the conference “Lessons of War and Future Reconstruction of the Country and Society”, held on the joint platform of the National University ”Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” and Ukrainian Catholic University on June 9, 2022. This is a preliminary presentation of joint achievements intended for further in-depth discussions, including at future conferences.

The document has been prepared on the basis of the materials of the joint creative work of the conference participants: Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Oksana Kulakovska, Nadiya Kobylyak, Valerii Pekar, Vitaliy Rudenkyi, Kostyantyn Peresedov, Kateryna Skorokhod, Anton Suslov also helped with creative work.

Politics and state power institutions 

1. Marginalization and reduction of the influence of anti-Ukrainian (pro-russian) forces — both at the national/state level (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine), and at the level of local self-government.
2. We see a consensus at all levels regarding further integration of Ukraine into the EU.
3. The main social gap between the supposedly pro-Ukrainian West and the pro-russian East, which has been shaping the political landscape in the country for almost 2 last decades, has disappeared.
4. The discourse on the Crimea has changed — now it is being discussed in the context of the new agenda, namely the need for military de-occupation of all occupied territories.
5. Decentralization has proven effective — many rapid response decisions are adopted and implemented at the regional level.
6. However, a threat has also appeared — political loyalty as a factor of centralized budget funding allocation for local authorities.
7. A noticeable reduction of the state involvement in certain areas in favor of the security focus.
8. Increasing trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and local authorities.
9. Strengthening of cooperation between state institutions and public initiatives, in particular volunteer initiatives related to solving humanitarian issues.
10. The division of people into those who love Ukraine and those who do not (blessed Lyubomyr Huzar) is not about attitudes, but rather about specific actions for the benefit of the country.
11. The capacity and/or incapacity of state authorities has become visible. and the understanding of the functions performed by the latter has also improved.
12. Reduction of digital transparency of state bodies (registry closure, etc.).
13. Increased risk of usurpation of power, manifested in several directions (see below).
14. Attack on media — selective channel closure.
15. Legitimation of manual control in state authorities.
16. Reduction of the role of the Parliament and the Government, with simultaneous strengthening of the Office of the President.
17. International “sacralization” of the president (respectively structured information campaign).
18. Proactive foreign policy rhetoric (including good work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
19. Application for being considered a geopolitical subject.
20. Application for the EU membership as a specific action. As a result — obtaining the status of candidate for the EU membership (updated after the conference).
21. Developing a request for an ethical politics framework.
22. Improving reputation.
23. Reinforcing the discourse on national identity.

Social relations and informal institutions (changes in the “unwritten rules” of interaction between people in the society are meant)

1. Interpersonal trust and trust in the security sector has increased, but not necessarily in other sectors of state responsibility.
2. Public recognition of the security and defense sector (we appreciate their professionalism).
3. The desire and real actions aimed at mutual assistance of individuals in the society have increased.
4. Activity on one’s own initiative / activism.
5. Charity is a mass phenomenon.
6. Changing attitudes towards the disadvantaged.
7. Solidarity regarding identity – being a Ukrainian has become universally attractive (the question remains whether this solidarity is temporary).
8. Awareness of the enemy — new markers “own”-“alien”.
9. Appropriation of the country — increased civic consciousness and social responsibility.
10. Increasing demand for gender equality.
11. Family trials related to relocation and activity in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
12. Emergence of Territorial Defense.
13. A specific role of Ukrainians abroad (not only as money earners).
14. Grassroots horizontal diplomacy through social networks and personal contacts.
15. At the level of consciousness, everyone must be agents of change to gain victory.
16. State monopolization of the information space.
17. Information policy has replaced reality (we don’t know the number of those perished, etc.) + information vacuum + self-censorship.
18. The emergence of world Ukrainianism – recognition of Ukrainians around the world (“Ukrainians are a brand”).
19. World Ukrainianism has manifested itself — the attitude is changing in Ukraine to the people staying abroad who are not citizens of Ukraine, but identify themselves as Ukrainians,.
20. Awareness of the benefits of mobility.
21. Emergence of the phenomenon of “twice internally displaced persons” (2014 and now).

Thinking, identity, culture

1. The Ukrainian language has become more common in the public space. More people are willing to demonstratively switch to Ukrainian, more Ukrainian can be heard in the field of services.
2. Military culture has started permeating deeper layers of the society. Military culture refers to role models, weapon ownership, practices and awareness of various types of weapons.
3. There is less pro-russian identity. Ukrainians have learned to “cancel” russian culture and export this “cancellation”.
4. The pantheon of heroes of the Return of Historical Memory has been updated. The events of the russian-Ukrainian war have raised the archetypes that were not understood before from memory. In particular, heroic deeds of Ukrainian soldiers and figures in the past have received new interpretations.
5. Support for pro-Ukrainian churches, in particular the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), has increased, and support for the church associated with moscow has dropped to a critical level.
6. In the West, the voice of cultural figures has become more vigorous. Our activists have something to say and have become more confident in speaking, but the problem of translating some of our experiences into the languages of external audiences is still there.
7. Territorial mobility of the population has increased: a large meeting of Ukrainians with Ukrainians has taken place. Many people have discovered regional cultural layers, social groups and ways of each other’s thinking. Subjectivization of the Ukrainian south and development of its identity has been launched. It has discovered it for itself, and Ukraine has begun to distinguish it in itself.
8. Ukrainians have “disenchanted” their image of a Western intellectual. We are witnessing the crisis of Western intellectual thought. The Western intellectual’s toolkit is too limited to understand the latest events in Ukraine.
9. The general demand for senses has increased. This means that there is an increased interest in continuity, in history, Ukrainians have discovered the power of conceptual thinking. Just the way the nations of the West did after the Second World War.
10. There is a feeling that there has been an increase in psychological and media literacy. However, this thesis is not supported unanimously. Social frustration of those who have moved out of the country, as well as those who could be but are not, where the hostilities are taking place now.
11. The gap between the emergence of an idea and its implementation has decreased — a “nation of doers”. This is seen as a mix of two feelings — being a subject (“I have to act”) and uncertainty (“tomorrow is unknown”).
12. Increasing personal responsibility to the society.
13. A new form of cultural text — memes — has appeared. We learn to express complex things via very simple forms.
14. Many people have realized that they are Ukrainians.
15. Growing attachment to NATO. Ukrainians have started feeling Eurocentric, a part of the Western club of states. The same has happened to Ukraine as far as the attitude of other states to it is concerned.
16. Ukrainians study foreign languages ​​and intensively familiarize themselves with Western experiences and practices.
17. Foreigners study Ukrainian.
18. Ukrainians’ understanding of the value of freedom and democracy has increased significantly.
19. In society the old lines of social divisions have become less visible, but new ones have appeared: they have been fighting — have not been fighting, they have left — have not left, they perceive the war empathically — have closed themselves from the war, etc.).
20. Collective responsibility has been legitimized in the society (primarily concerning russians, but not only). Ukrainians are trying to export this legitimation outside their country. In particular, they oppose the opinion that only putin is to blame for the war.
21. There has appeared a feeling of a total and unavoidable threat — there are no safe places. No one is guaranteed safety. Reactionary culture (recording the fact). A very active process of event documentation is taking place. The war continues in real time.
22. There has been a great meeting of Ukrainians and Europe and the world (dual effects on the European identity of Ukrainians: on the one hand, Ukrainians have got to know Europe more and better; while, on the other hand, some myths about Europe have been debunked).
23. Changes in the sense of inferiority of Ukrainians as compared to the West are being recorded. There has been a debate about the depth of and the need for this change.
24. There is a great social trauma (the effect will depend on when the victory will come and what it will be like).
25. Awareness of the safety speech characteristic of older generations (“peaceful sky”, “good night”, etc.) All these words have acquired tactile coloring.
26. Ukrainian events outlined the dividing line between good and evil, black and white. Ukrainians are pushing themselves and the Western world to make a choice within this division.
27. The sense of separateness/uniqueness of the Ukrainian political nation has grown.
28. Tolerance towards various minorities (national, LGBT+, religious, etc.) and political opponents is growing.
29. Two latent parallel processes can be traced: the tendency to authoritarianism and increased role of the central government vs the tendency to chaos, diversification and bottom-to-top networking . These two modes of the society coexist and make an unstable equilibrium.
30. Animal care has never been more public and visible than it is now.

Economy

1. Direct destructive impact of military actions:

• Decreased industrial activity in the east (two large metallurgical plants have been affected).
• Loss of oil refineries.
• Ruined infrastructure — transport, logistics, export impossibility.
• Ruined housing stock.
• The problem of crop harvesting, storage and transportation.
• Looting, smuggling of goods.
• Human trafficking.

2. Destructive impact of military operations on the financial system:

• Decreased state and local budget revenues.
• The threat of not receiving foreign exchange revenues from agriculture, IT, and work abroad.
• Increased inflation, resulting in a sharp accounting rate increase.
• Dependence of state finance on donors.
• Accumulation of debts of state-owned companies.
• Reduction of incomes of Ukrainians.
• Delay in social benefit payments.
• Increased cost of finance for enterprises.

3. Destructive impact of military operations on human capital:

• Labor migration.
• Available workforce reduction.
• Departure of students as well as young people in general abroad.
• Mobilization has led to a decrease in workforce, lack of profile specialists, and impossibility of restoring business due to lack of key employees.
• Growing unemployment.
• The number of people without housing in private ownership and without the prospects of purchasing it in the medium term has increased.
• People have lost real estate as a means of accumulation.
• Risks with human capital reproduction.

4. Other indirect destructive factors:

• Increased energy vulnerability.
• Economy militarization.
• Shortage of fuel, construction materials, etc.
• Access to technology has become worse.

5. Related negative factors:

• Part of the institutions have turned out to be incompetent / inactive.
• Political dependence on local budget finance.
• Exchange rate business: “foreign currency tourism”.

6. Economic resilience:

• State-owned companies have proven to be resilient.
• The banking system has kept its positions.
• Shadow economy has saved the Armed Forces.
• Retraining of people and businesses.
• Growing role of ecosystems.

7. Structural changes:

• Mass IT relocation abroad.
• Changing the east-west balance: shift in the center of economic activity.
• Logistics / transport chains have changed.
• Growth of the market of military goods.

8. Government’s anti-crisis solutions:

• Certain taxes and duties, certain (capital) expenditures have been canceled.
• Customs (customs control and duties) has been canceled.
• The system of budget expenditures has changed.
• Prozorro has been suspended.
• VAT refund has been suspended.
• Some registries have been closed.
• In practice, the Government saw the inefficiency of market price regulation (gasoline).
• The “2%” tax system has not worked.

9. Positive factors:

• Strengthening of horizontal business ties with Europe.
• Emergence of new niches previously occupied by russian goods and services.
• Reduction of political weight of oligarchs as the result of their losses.
• Paypal has started its operation in Ukraine.
• Increase in local production values.
• New opportunities to protect national producers.
• Creative industries “are boosting” the skills that can be capitalized.
• There has appeared a chance for inventors with prototypes.

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The editorial “rule of small letters” or the “rule of disrespect for criminals” applies to all the words related to evil, like names and surnames of terrorists, war criminals, rapists, murderers, and torturers. They do not deserve being capitalized but shall be written in italics to stay in the focus of the readers’ attention. 

The programme “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” has been created by joint effort and with the financial support of the institution’s members of the Cultural Business Education Hub, the European Cultural Foundation, and BBK — the Regensburg Art and Culture Support Group from the Professional Association of Artists of Lower Bavaria/Upper Palatinate.

Authors: Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Oksana Kulakovska, Nadiya Kobylyak, Valerii Pekar, Vitaliy Rudenkyi, Kostyantyn Peresedov, Kateryna Skorokhod, Anton Suslov also helped with creative work.

Translator (from Ukrainian): Halyna Pekhnyk

Illustrator: fragment of plasticine panel by Olha Protasova

Copyeditors: Yuliia Moroz, Terra Friedman King

Proofreaders: Tetiana Vorobtsova, Terra Friedman King

Content Editors: Maryna Korchaka, Natalia Babalyk

Program Directors: Julia Ovcharenko and Demyan Om Dyakiv-Slavitski