Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Valerii Pekar — April 18-30, 2022

Flash essays from the collection “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” tell about the insights, experiences, and beliefs of Ukrainians, which ignited their society in 2022, when the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine began.

The Cultural Hub community and curators carefully collected, translated, and illustrated these texts in order to capture the values ​​of Ukrainians — Freedoms, Bravery, Dignity, Responsibility, and Humour. 

A series of publications in partnership with Chytomo introduces this collection to the English-speaking audience. Volume 12 continues to present the series. You can get acquainted with the previous collection here.

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. April 18

If russia is rich and powerful, why are their soldiers looting Ukrainian villages?

In addition to the horrific images of butchery broadcast from Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka, and other suburbs northwest of Kyiv, perhaps one of the most shocking residuals of last month’s occupation of the northern parts of Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts, is the widespread looting that russian soldiers engaged in there.

Apparently, when the russians saw the standard of living of suburban Ukrainians, many of whom in rural areas, they were overcome with envy. And they didn’t even get to Kyiv! What does that say about the real state of russia’s economy?

The retreating russians took everything.

Their transport trucks were packed with refrigerators, television sets, ovens, clothing, shoes – everything that could be looted from the homes they had occupied and from those of neighbors they had pilfered. One photo of a russian truck disabled by the advancing Ukrainian forces showed two wheels from passenger cars strapped on to the front grill together with a shovel, hoe and rake. Apparently gardening instruments are in short supply in russia.

It would seem that incidents of looting by the retreating russians were not isolated.

Intercepted telephone conversations between russian soldiers and their wives and girlfriends back home reveal the women encouraging their men to bring back as much plunder as possible: the request for a perfume sample box and jewelry (“especially gold crosses and diamond earrings”) particularly sticks in mind.

A recent social media post from Kharkiv provides a radical contrast to the russians’ barbarism.

Apparently, most of the windows in the shops on Sumska Street (the main artery of the now destroyed eastern Ukrainian city) were blown out in early March, but the goods inside were untouched. Even food stores remained intact, despite the obvious need. Kharkiv’s Ukrainian residents refused to steal.

Similar remarkable respect for private property among Ukrainians was observed in Kyiv during the Maidan protests of 2013–2014: despite 90 days of mass demonstrations, not a single store window was smashed in the center of Ukraine’s capital. Not a single shop was looted.

Dissimilarity with the russians could not be more striking: in the villages north of Kyiv, they swarmed in like locusts, pilfering everything they could get their hands on. Reports on social media have shown russian soldiers sending the most bizarre stolen goods home after their withdrawal to belarus: toasters, drill sets, slippers, used underwear…

A logical question is raised after observing such behavior: how can these be the actions of military personnel of a country that, according to World Bank statistics, is three times richer than Ukraine?

I was always taught economics is a “hard” science. Apparently, economists believe their statistical analyses can be used not only to explain, but to predict human behavior. In the russian and Ukrainian cases, something seems to have gone terribly wrong. Let’s examine some statistics:

According to the World Bank, in 2020, nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Ukraine amounted to $3,727. In russia, in the same year, the globally accepted indicator of total wealth per person totaled $10,126. Hence, the russian economy was said to produce almost three times more wealth per person than its Ukrainian counterpart.

Compared to Europe, russians were said to be worse off than Poles (GDP per capita in Poland in 2020: $15 656), but comparable to Bulgarians (GDP per capita in Bulgaria in 2020: $9975). In 2020 Lithuania’s GDP per capita was twice that of russia, totaling $19 997.

With GDP per capita statistics at almost one-third those of Bulgaria and russia, more than five times smaller than Lithuania’s and four times smaller than Poland’s, Ukraine has repeatedly been called the “poorest country in Europe.” Incidentally, according to the World Bank, belarus is said to be twice as well off as Ukraine with nominal GDP per capita at $6,411 (difficult to believe).

As shown in the graph below, even when we compare GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) — a method of smoothing differences in currency values compared to the U.S. dollar, the total for russia in 2020 is $29,812 and it’s over twice that of Ukraine: $13,054.

So why are the russians looting Ukraine? Why would the soldiers of an invading country that is supposedly twice or three times as rich as the target of its invasion, need to steal household goods from villagers?

The simple answer is inequality. Apparently, the russian military units that invaded Kyiv oblast were drawn from the poorest regions of russia. There, wealth is concentrated in the two biggest cities of moscow and st. petersburg, and even there — in the hands of a select few.

Nevertheless, if the statistics are to be believed, even the poorest of russians should still be richer than Ukraine’s rural population! russia has an extremely high Gini coefficient — the measure of economic inequality that unfortunately is highly inaccurate, but nevertheless used widely.

However, with an economy the size officially reported by russia, their poor soldiers should be at least as well off as the villagers of Ukraine’s northern regions where lifestyles are significantly more modest than in urban areas.

According to some local villagers, the invading soldiers had never seen an indoor toilet. They were surprised that roads in Ukraine’s villages are paved. Indeed, apparently the russians were so shocked by what they saw as opulent living standards of Ukrainians that they left graffiti asking: “Who gave you permission to live well?”

Famously, Winston Churchill defined russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”.

It would seem the enigma has been unraveled in Ukraine: russian economic statistics are a lie. russia is bankrupt. Unfortunately, its population — particularly its soldiers — don’t know it yet. Evidently, they are being awakened to this fact in Ukraine.

The late U.S. Senator John McCain seemed to have got it right when he called russia “a gas station masquerading as a country” and then called the WSJ article on “putin’s Potemkin economy” a must-read.

It would seem putin’s Potemkin-style lie extends not only to his economy. His army has shown itself to be highly overrated. The much-vaulted Black Sea Fleet has just lost its flagship (to an opponent that has no navy of which to speak). The russian air force seems capable of assaulting unarmed civilian targets, but not much else.

Could it be that russia’s nuclear threat is also hollow?

#ThoughtsfromKyiv

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. April 21

putin’s escalation moment: Not thinking the unthinkable doesn’t make it go away

Apparently, this next phase of the war may prove decisive: If the Ukrainian forces are seriously weakened by the russians, the kremlin will have its “Victory Day” celebration on May 9 — whether in moscow, Donetsk or Mariupol matters little. On the other hand, if the russian army loses in the Donbas, then moscow’s next move is less clear, or rather — clear, but unthinkable, and so most choose to ignore it.

A Ukrainian victory is undoubtedly what most of us are hoping for. But when Ukrainian troops finally trounce the russian invader, when will the war end? Do we actually believe that russian president vladimir putin will accept defeat and/or will sue for peace when his troops are stopped (again) dead in their tracks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

When putin finally realizes that russia’s “special military operation” has failed, he will escalate. When exactly this “escalation moment” will come is difficult to predict since the russian military command seems convinced that a miraculous ground victory may yet be achieved in Ukraine. russia has seemingly endless amounts of military equipment on offer. But those tanks, armored personnel carriers, truck-mounted rocket launchers, etc. need qualified and motivated troops to operate them. And lately, finding competent russians willing to fight in Ukraine has proved problematic.

Nevertheless, according to the latest dispatches, the battle for the Donbas is imminent, or may have already begun. The russians are keen to show some semblance of victory by May 7 — putin’s inauguration day — so that a full-scale celebration of their “might” can be organized on May 9 (soviet-era “Victory Day”).

The only problem with this plan is that the capitulation of Ukraine within the next three weeks is obviously unachievable, and even securing an expansion of russian-occupied territory in the Donbas and establishment of a russian-controlled land corridor to Crimea (i.e. occupation of Mariupol, southern Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts) is going to be highly problematic.

What then?

Then vladimir putin will turn to the only weapon left in his arsenal that can secure him a “victory” — the nuclear option.

Several commentators have countered this prediction, arguing that the chain of command required to launch a nuclear strike is complex, and so it is unlikely that any order to launch emanating from the kremlin would be carried out by field commanders. Others (including me) have suggested that russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal is old, dilapidated, and unlikely to be functional. All of these are valid points, but they are only relevant if one is considering a full-scale russian nuclear attack.

What about a single tactical strike with a small nuclear weapon on a single Ukrainian city? The resultant level of destruction would be comparable to that seen in Mariupol during the past four weeks — tragic, but not global. However, the effect would be highly symbolic: it would represent the first time that nuclear weapons had been used in battle since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and would necessitate a response from the world’s other nuclear powers.

However, what if, after the attack, moscow immediately transmitted a public message to the West: “Stop supporting Ukraine, or the next bomb will fall on one of your cities!” How would the people of Poland, Germany, France and other EU states respond? More importantly, how would the leaders of the three NATO member states who possess nuclear weapons respond? Would they act in congruence, or each to his own?

Even if russia’s target were to be a Ukrainian city, the moment russia launches a tactical nuclear weapon, the initiative of leadership will pass from President Zelensky to the leadership of NATO. At that moment, russia’s war in Ukraine would become a (fully) global problem. So, how will the West react? Have the leaders of the U.K., France and the U.S. established plans for this contingency or is it too unthinkable?

I’m told that once they have reached the pinnacle of their careers, the priorities of elected leaders change: Prime Ministers and Presidents become less concerned with their popularity (electability) and think more of their historical legacy. It is at that point that a leader’s “moral compass” and/or “character” proves decisive.

In June 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had a choice. After the evacuation of the British and allied forces from Dunkirk, he could have responded to the multiple private messages sent to him by adolf hitler and agreed to a new division of Europe. hitler had by that time taken Belgium, the Netherlands and half of France, and had divided Poland with stalin. That could have been the end of it. The Battle of Britain could have been avoided. The London bombings might never have happened. Continental Europe would have been sacrificed, but Britain would have had peace. Most importantly, millions of British lives would have been saved.

If Churchill had been guided by a different moral compass, World War II could have been forestalled — likely to be fought later, but that is another story.

Churchill chose war. His legacy is that of a righteous leader with an iron character. I suspect today, 80 years later, the French, the Dutch, the Belgians, the Poles, and indeed the Germans (not to mention the Jews of Europe) are grateful for his choice. That war, despite the millions who died, left a legacy of peace, prosperity, and unprecedented human development.

In October 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy had a choice. After making it publicly clear to the soviet government and to the world that the U.S. would not accept the stationing of nuclear missiles in Cuba, he used back channels to make a deal: the US withdrew its missiles from Turkey in exchange for the ussr withdrawing theirs from Cuba. Peace was “purchased” for the price of Cuba: the island remained communist but disarmed.

Kennedy was shot in Dallas a year later and will always be remembered by Americans as a heroic leader. But what about Cuba? That country has been an economic, political, and social basket-case for the past 60 years. And not just because of the Castros. The country was abandoned and its people deemed expendable.

I am not suggesting that Kennedy’s choice during the Cuban Missile Crisis was wrong. Indeed, the standoff against soviet premier nikita khrushchev led to the demise of the latter. Mind you, khrushchev was replaced by leonid brezhnev, and that was not a better result for soviet citizens: dissidents jailed, economy stagnated, freedom stifled…

Had Kennedy stood firm against the soviet threat without a backchannel deal, I might not be writing these words at all because global thermonuclear war would have prevented my existence. On the other hand, the ussr may not have survived a morally principled American President and would have collapsed decades earlier than it did. These are all “what ifs” and probably not helpful.

The choice to be made by leaders in crucial moments always boils down to the following:

Do we all sacrifice some in the short term for the sake of what is right for all in the long term (as Churchill did)? Or do we make a deal now, delaying the eventual inevitable sacrifice, for the sake of the living (the Kennedy option)?

I don’t have a singular answer, but I certainly don’t envy Misters Biden, Johnson and Macron. Only these three men have the ability to counter putin’s nuclear blackmail. I think this is what President Zelensky meant when he recently stated to a CNN reporter that “the world should be prepared for the possibility that putin could use nuclear weapons.”

When russia’s “escalation moment” comes, their characters and moral compasses will be tested like never before.

#ThoughtsfromKyiv

Valerii Pekar: Unlearned lessons come back. April 26

People in the news feed are arguing whether Trump should be given Twitter. If not, that is obviously not democracy and freedom of speech. If yes, he will break the minds of half of Americans again and will become President in 2024.

That is what I am talking about. Mankind should learn this lesson. Unlearned lessons are getting back. Nobody is entitled to approach mankind, pat it on the head, and say: “Well, this is the lesson that is too difficult for you, that is the task with an asterisk, let us do it next time, in some one hundred years, now you are not ready yet.”

The unlearned lesson of 1918 came back to Ukraine in 2014, and then the poorly studied lesson of 2014 came back in 2022.

The unlearned lesson of 1993 came back to the rf in 2000. The unlearned lesson of the First Chechen War came back as the Second Chechen War.

The unlearned lesson of World War I came back to Europe as World War II. 

Hegel is credited with the statement that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.

No, history first means a warning, while second — a bloody meat grinder, third – even a bloodier meat grinder. And already fourth — it comes as a farce that can also be bloody.

What inspires and instills hope is that many lessons have been learned. Poland learned the lessons of 1795. Germany learned the lessons of 1933. Israel learned the lessons of 1935. Finland learned the lessons of 1939. The Czech Republic learned the lessons of 1968.

A book on the topic: Ken Wilber, “Trump and a Post-Truth World.”

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. April 26

Thoughts on Ukraine’s contribution to human development (When we win)

This war must have a purpose. Perhaps my thinking is mystical, but history seems to show that changing the course of human development sometimes requires catastrophe, and so the optimist in me would like to believe that this war is actually a means to a (better) end. Could it be that all this death and destruction may have some constructive purpose?

In the social sciences, much has been written over the past 3–4 decades about humanity’s apparently ongoing shift to “post-industrial society” (Daniel Bell), about the “third wave” of development (Alvin Toffler), about western society’s transition to “postmodernism” (Francois Lyotard). Globally, how wealth is generated is transforming: away from industrial production to services. In Ukraine, for the past two decades over 60% of GDP has been generated by services.

The global shift away from industrial production has altered the ways we structure organizations. Hierarchy is out, teamwork is in, as a new “creative class” (Richard Florida) emerges demanding change in the way companies and organizations are managed. In the political sphere, Moses Naim has pointed out a trend towards an “end of power” in the traditional sense, and growth in importance of informal influence. As humans entered the third millennium, the hierarchic “bureaucratic” (Max Weber) nation-state — the foundation for large-scale organization — was repeatedly undermined by (no less bureaucratic) international alliances and unions.

Throughout Europe and the West, the industrial revolution of the 19th century spawned a particular way of life in the 20th century: power relations between classes and states, globalization, mass consumption, individualist values and norms, stable rule systems… Three decades into the 21st century, that civilizational system is obviously changing. Could russia’s disastrous war in Ukraine provide a clue as to the direction and/or outcome of that change?

So far, this war can be described as a contest between a large hierarchical, bureaucratic (corrupt), large war machine against a smaller, idealistic, nimble network of determined citizens. The Ukrainian side has benefited from more advanced (western supplied) weaponry, but this is only part of the story of its success: the early victories of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are largely attributable to the “flat” network structure of their organizational structures. These proved to be highly effective against the large invading columns of russian soldiers.

Ukraine’s “team of teams” structures (described by General Stanley McChrystal) seem to permeate all of society, not just the Army. Nominally, the leader of Ukraine is President Zelensky. In practice, groups organize spontaneously into small, highly-mobilized teams in which everyone seems to know exactly what to do without being told. We first observed this phenomenon during the Maidan protests, but now it seems to have become pervasive. And it may be one of the keys to Ukraine’s success in this war.

The “secret sauce” that makes Ukrainian citizens’ networks effective seems to be idealism, rather than economics or material interests. On the battlefield and behind the lines in volunteer support organizations we are witnessing the power of an idea — namely, freedom from the oppressor/invader — activated by a consolidated identity. In line with accepted wisdom, this was not supposed to happen in a supposedly ethnically, linguistically and regionally divided Ukraine.

According to the classic description of the historical emergence of nations (Anthony D. Smith) the development of “nationalism” in Europe followed one of two possible models. In Western Europe and North America, national identity arose in an inclusive “civic” version, centered on allegiance to state institutions and symbols (flag, territory, Constitution, etc.) that allowed for membership regardless of race, creed, background. By contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe and (particularly) pre-war Germany, “nation” was identified in a much narrower scope: according to ethnicity, language, and accepted historical myth. Throughout the 20th century, the “ethnic” conception of nation was associated with violence, expansion, xenophobia, and intolerance. The civic identity model was said to promote institutional patriotism but eschewed radicalism and was rarely politicized.

The notions of “nation” that have emerged as a result of russia’s aggression in Ukraine (beginning in 2014) are atypical for Eastern Europe and defy the accepted dichotomy of identity models. As a multi-ethnic polity, the russian federation should have adopted a civic national identity. Instead, moscow has propagated a quasi-fascist, expansionist ideology that seeks to “protect” russian-speakers in the near-abroad. Strangely, the “russian world” imperialist project is being realized in Ukraine by soldiers who are not ethnic russians. These Chechens, Buryats, Tatars, and multiple other ethnicities that make up the russian federation fight (murder, pillage, rape) in the name of “liberating” russians in Ukraine — people who identify themselves as Ukrainians, but whom the kremlin considers to be ethnic russians. So much for “civic” identity…

On the other hand, in Ukraine, whose leaders have been accused of officially tolerating “far-right” nationalist groups who adopt questionable symbols (e.g. Azov), a civic identity that is inclusive of both russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers has developed. This new Ukrainian identity is deliberately blind to ethnic background, religious affiliation or linguistic preference. It is this allegedly depoliticized civic identity that has rallied the country’s vast network of volunteers and soldiers into a resistance movement. So much for civic identity having weak mobilizational potential…

When we prevail, this war will be studied not only by social scientists, but also by historians: as a time when humanity underwent a fundamental transition from its outdated industrial-era paradigms that fostered hierarchy, to a new “communitarian” heterarchic principle of organizing social life in which identity plays a new and powerful role.

I wonder if Ukraine’s heterarchic political culture and our newfound models of solidarity might be part of the essence of our contribution to civilization; our nudge of humanity towards a new phase of development. Understanding the grand narrative of what we are experiencing doesn’t necessarily make our current tragedy any less appalling, but it may provide some comfort to understand that through sacrifice on multiple battlefields, Ukrainians are contributing (if not leading) the developmental shift required for the next phase of the evolution of European (western) civilization.

That may give this mindless war a purpose.

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. April 28

Today was an intellectually stimulating day aimed at trying to understand what western academics are saying about the current war in Ukraine (not an easy task when one is in Ukraine, limited in contact to email, social media, and occasional Zoom meetings).

Academic discourse matters. The way academics interpret events affects the way policy-makers see the world. The link is not always obvious (particularly for academics). The war in Ukraine demonstrates not only the link, but also diffusion delay — the time required for ideas developed in academia to percolate to policy-makers.

My estimate: for Ukraine the delay has been 10 years in the past, but events have now shortened timespans significantly.

Today, I had the pleasure of listening to two discussions organized by the Vienna-based IWM (Institute for Human Sciences). One with Nataliya Gumenyuk on journalism during the war (event held April 20 — recording available on IWM.at). The other on self-organization as Ukraine’s new culture of civic engagement (held today, but recording available on IWM.at).

I then switched to the excellent talk by Volodymyr Kulyk on What Have We Learned about Ethnonational Identities in Ukraine, organized by Zois-Berlin (highly recommended!).

Kulyk convincingly argues that identity is not (only) about language. It’s also not about (only) about ethnicity or (only) about civic engagement in social institutions. Ethnonational identity is complicated (particularly in Ukraine). It is measurable in the Ukrainian context through surveys that ask respondents what their “native language” is (not what language they use), but combined with other measures as well.

A report by Rating Group — a reputable polling agency in Ukraine — shows data that supports Kulyk’s argument: “Over the last decade, there has been a steady growth in the number of those who consider Ukrainian their mother tongue: from 57% in 2012 to 76% in 2022.”

If only policy-makers would understand this shift! The notion of a “divided Ukraine” is very much about the past. During the past decade, Ukrainians have united, consolidated, congealed in an ethnonational identity (how this happened is a separate discussion) that few seemed to have noticed.

Until the russians attacked…

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. April 29

Dilemmas of war:

• When the news is not good, do you stay quiet or publish anyway?
• Where is the line between keeping up morale and spreading truth?
• When you disagree 110% with a policy currently being put forward by the Ukrainian government (and it is a policy that does not directly affect the war effort), do you scream about it from every “rooftop,” or do you stay quiet because we’re fighting a war?
• Where is the line between civic duty to control government and obligation to maintain solidarity in wartime?

I don’t know the answers to these questions, and so I’ve decided to play it safe: stay quiet with my criticisms (for now).

But when we win this war, much housekeeping and soul searching will need to be done: education, language policy, judiciary, police, media, customs, healthcare… All of it needs overhauling. No more “accidental” appointments of those tasked with the job: these areas are critical to making a country work, and so need visionaries and excellent teams to take care of them.

There is soooo much to do to make Ukraine the ideal that we are currently fighting for, and for which our finest are dying. We owe them!

The current leadership of Ukraine is enjoying a very public love-fest. They’ve done an excellent job of mobilizing international support for the war effort, and for that Ukrainians throughout the world are (and will always be) grateful. But a leader in war is not necessarily a leader in peace.

Mistakes have been made and continue to be made. We are not criticizing now because there’s a war on, but that silence cannot and should not last forever.

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. April 30

This weekend Ukrainians commemorate their ancestors. The tradition is known as “Hrobky” — literally meaning “Graves.” Today and tomorrow people visit cemeteries.

According to religious tradition, the commemoration is supposed to occur on the first Sunday after Easter: St. Thomas’s Day when the passage from the Gospel describing the Risen Christ’s appearance to his disciples is read in church. But there are so many graves to visit that people start commemorations on Saturday.

In central Ukraine, many religious traditions have been lost — suppressed by many years of soviet oppression. Our village near Kyiv has no church: it was destroyed in the 1930’s by stalin’s henchmen. A small room in the village administrative building was turned into a chapel over a decade ago, but it is not well attended.

Today, at the village cemetery that we visited (our neighbours’ ancestors are buried there), the accepted greeting was “Christ is Risen” — always answered with “He is Risen indeed.” But when the priest walked through the rows, few stopped him to say a prayer at their grave. Perhaps it was because the local priest has not yet denounced the moscow patriarchate (several others in the area have recently switched to the Kyiv patriarchate*). Perhaps it was because people here have never been taught to pray. Either way, the priest got a cold shoulder.

But the commemoration was anything but cold. The whole village gathered at the cemetery. People brought sweets to leave on the graves and to hand out to children. No laughing, but lots of chatter. Honest talk: about who was good in life and who was not so good; about relatives who lived through horrors; about the many refugees that have swelled the population of our village during the past two months; about how the cemetery will have to be expanded soon.

People came to talk. They visited each other; sat together on benches erected in the rows; chatted about their families, about the weather, about the war.

One young lady drew particular attention: she was newly widowed. Her husband had recently perished in the Donbas. His remains are expected home in the next week or so, and they will be buried with full military honors. The village will again turn out. We will all stand on our knees in the procession. “Heroes never die” will be repeated — although in fact they do. But they are remembered. And they are thanked for their sacrifice.

And life — and the war — goes on.

I have been asked recently by students and by journalists why our family stays where we are — despite the war, despite the trauma that our kids are likely to be experiencing, despite the potential danger. I don’t know if this is an adequate answer, but mine is “because this is home.”

Because here, people chat about the everyday things that make us human. Because, although my own ancestors are buried elsewhere, here I feel their presence. Because no man is an island, and we are fully human only when we are with others who understand, who interact, who live honestly, and have done so for generations.

**  PS: The cherry blossoms have started to bloom in my “sadok vyshnevyi kolo khaty!”

And the storks have laid their eggs in the nest by our house. The cycle of life continues…

* Orthodox Church of Ukraine 

** ‘A cherry orchard by the house’ (translated from Ukrainian) is a famous phrase from the poem by the popular Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko.

The editorial “rule of small letters” or the “rule of disrespect for criminals” applies to all the words related to evil, like names and surnames of terrorists, war criminals, rapists, murderers, and torturers. They do not deserve being capitalized but shall be written in italics to stay in the focus of the readers’ attention. 

The program “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” has been created by joint effort and with the financial support of the institution’s members of the Cultural Business Education Hub, the European Cultural Foundation, and BBK — the Regensburg Art and Culture Support Group from the Professional Association of Artists of Lower Bavaria/Upper Palatinate.

Authors: Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Valerii Pekar

Translator (from Ukrainian): Halyna Pekhnyk (Valerii Pekar’s essay)

Illustrators: Victoria Boyko (Mychailo Wynnycky’s essays), Max Palenko (Valerii Pekar’s essay), and plasticine panel by Olha Protasova

Copyeditors: Yuliia Moroz, Terra Friedman King

Proofreaders: Iryna Andrieieva, Tetiana Vorobtsova, Terra Friedman King

Content Editors: Maryna Korchaka, Natalia Babalyk

Program Directors: Julia Ovcharenko and Demyan Om Dyakiv-Slavitski