March 19-22, 2022 — Volodymyr Yermolenko, Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Valerii Pekar

Flash essays from the collection “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” tell about the insights, experiences, and beliefs of Ukrainians, which ignited their society in 2022, when the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine began.

The Cultural Hub community and curators carefully collected, translated, and illustrated these texts in order to capture the values ​​of Ukrainians — Freedoms, Bravery, Dignity, Responsibility, and Humour. 

A series of publications in partnership with Chytomo introduces this collection to the English-speaking audience. Volume 6 continues to present the series. You can get acquainted with the previous collection here.

Volodymyr Yermolenko: … But neither human nature nor the logic of history can be defeated by them. March 20

the russians want to restore their “greatness,” but instead they are destroying their country for good.

They claim that they are protecting the “people of Donbas,” but instead they are wiping Mariupol off the face of the earth.

They are fighting against “Nazism,” but use half a swastika as their symbol.

They want to restore a “bipolar world,” but behave as if they had a bipolar disorder.

They are waging war not only against Ukraine. They are waging war against human nature, reason, good judgement, common sense, humanity, humanness.

But neither human nature nor the logic of history can be defeated by them.

russia is a wounded and impotent empire using the last ounce of its strength to regain its past, but by doing so it is only wasting the last resources of its frail body, bringing its collapse closer.

Mychailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. March 20 

Einstein once wrote that time was relative. This proposition is nowhere more evident than in a war. For some it seems to move faster, for others — much slower.

We are now in Day 25 of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by russia. On the ground it feels like we’ve lived 2,5 years since 24 February. For the rest of the world (including for the kremlin I suspect), it’s been less than a month.

During these 3,5 weeks the world has witnessed the valor and bravery of Ukrainians. To the surprise of many “experts,” the Ukrainian Armed Forces have stopped the russian ground assault practically everywhere. No doubt many pages will be written in the future aimed at explaining how/why putin failed. I wish my colleagues all the best in that endeavor.

Right now, in Ukraine, we have no time for academic analysis. We have a war to win.

The russians have now moved to Phase 2 of their war strategy which involves indiscriminate destruction of Ukraine’s urban centers, causing numerous humanitarian catastrophes, flooding the West with Ukrainian refugees. Their “scorched earth” tactics in Mariupol and Kharkiv have caused countless civilian deaths. The world has now become (almost) accustomed to awful images of human suffering flowing endlessly from Ukraine. In a civilized world there should be no tolerance of such misery.

Western governments have responded to the pressure of their own citizens and the media with relaxed visa requirements for Ukrainians fleeing violence, massive social and humanitarian assistance to those suffering in Ukraine, provision of extensive military aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and comprehensive sanctions against russia.

Ukrainians are grateful for the help. We have asked for more (including MiG-29’s) but we understand that the West has provided what it can. Indeed, the reaction has been extraordinary and swift by bureaucratic standards. Thank you!

However, we must keep our eye on the ball: We have a war to win.

I read countless policy advisers and pundits providing analysis of the “peace talks.” Let me put my two cents into this discussion: after the destruction of Mariupol and Kharkiv these talks have become irrelevant. Ukrainians are adamant: we have a war to win.

The notion of Ukraine’s supposed “armed neutrality” (i.e. repudiation of future NATO membership), or proposals involving recognition of Crimea as russian and/or the l/dnr as independent, may have all had a slim chance of being accepted by Ukrainians two weeks ago. But now that the russians have launched Phase 2 in full (wholesale bombardment of cities without ground advance); now that Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv have been destroyed; now that Mariupol has been laid waste … Now, Ukrainians will accept nothing less than full victory.

Time has moved fast here — much faster than outside Ukraine. Ukrainians’ expectations three weeks ago, expectations last week, and expectations presently — these are three absolutely different sets of expectations. In the beginning the priority was defense at all costs. Then it became: to end the war quickly. Now: we have a war to win.

That shift of mindset is not necessarily understood outside Ukraine (or so it seems from my reading).

I am reminded of another incongruity in timing that occurred during the Maidan protests. Prior to the regime’s attack on peaceful students in Kyiv on November 30, Ukrainians were prepared to accept Yanukovych as their president even though we objected to his pro-russian policies. After the student beatings his legitimacy was lost, but we would still have been prepared to sign a peace deal for the sake of ending the protests (and then trouncing Yanukovych in an election). All of that changed on 19 January 2014. When the first blood was spilled on Maidan, any chance of a “deal” was off the table. And when the deal was eventually signed on 21 February (under massive political pressure from EU intermediaries), the protesters rejected it outright. Yanukovych could do nothing else than flee the country.

The Ukrainian population is now in the same state as the Maidan protesters at the end of January 2014. If last week some here were still hoping for a diplomatic resolution, and were prepared to compromise to achieve this end, now — no more.

According to most recent opinion polls (screenshot in first comment):

• 93% of Ukrainians oppose any cessation of hostilities prior to the full withdrawal of russian forces
• 89% state that signing a deal with russia prior to its full withdrawal from Ukraine is unacceptable
• 82% believe the splintering of Ukraine as a result of the war is unlikely
• 47% believe victory over russia is possible during the coming weeks
• 23% believe the war will last several months
• 12% believe the war will last 6 months to a year

Cumulatively the numbers above indicate over 80% of Ukrainians are prepared for a long war, and over 90% see the purpose of this fight unambiguously: to rid Ukraine (fully!) of the russian invader.

Incidentally, on the NATO issue:

• 44% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO
• 42% support close cooperation with NATO without membership
• 7% oppose cooperation with NATO

Ukrainians are prepared to continue fighting — in close cooperation with NATO, but without reliance on the western alliance. Again, thank you friends, but we’ve got your back.

My friends, it’s time to catch up to the new reality. Humanitarian aid is helpful. Refugee relief is gratefully accepted. Sanctions are good because they weaken the enemy. Speeches in Parliaments that provoke standing ovations are fantastic…

But right now, we need military hardware — fast. We have a war to win.

#ThoughtsfromKyiv

Mychailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. March 21 

Why are Ukrainians winning this war? I promised not to dwell on this topic, but given that I may have a different perspective from most pundits and “experts,” I thought mine was (perhaps) worth sharing.

What we are experiencing in Ukraine is a case study in massive and very abrupt social change. In addition to the unfathomable destruction and human suffering, there is something important going on here from the point of view of social science, which (I suggest) is indicative not only of the local phenomenon, but of our understanding of human society more broadly.

So, what’s special about the local phenomenon?

Firstly, a smaller army is beating a larger one — unexpectedly and unambiguously. The russian army continues to inflict incomprehensible damage to Ukraine’s cities, but the ground advance of the supposedly more powerful force has been (almost) completely halted.

Secondly, a nation that was (until a month ago) supposedly deeply divided along ethno-linguistic and regional lines has suddenly united in seemingly monolithic defense against an invader whose identity (language, history) is obviously proximate for a large proportion of that nation’s citizens (for those who disagree: the Ukrainian and russian cultures and languages are certainly more proximate than say Ukrainian and German). This degree and depth of popular mobilization is not “normal.”

Thirdly, in addition to the extreme civilian strife caused by russian rockets and bombs (sadly — comparable to the human losses of other wars), combat fatalities experienced by the invader are unprecedented. Today, the Ukrainian authorities announced that their estimate of the number of russians killed in action (KIA) has passed the 15 thousand mark. Conservative US estimates are half those claimed by the Ukrainians, but even so, the number of russians killed in Ukraine during the past 26 days is staggering.

Some comparative context: The combined number of US combat deaths in the post-911 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (lasting 20 years) amounted to just over 7 thousand troops. The ussr lost over 15 thousand men in 10 years of war in Afghanistan. KIA numbers in Ukraine are comparable to the totals of these wars after less than one month!

In reality, no one knows the exact number of russians killed thus far in Ukraine. When a Ukrainian missile hits a russian armored vehicle or tank, the result is combustion of such intensity that (in the words of one Ukrainian officer): “the human remains fit into a jar.”

Why is this war so deadly? Clearly the technology of death has “improved” significantly during the past decade: Javelin, NLAW and Stuhna anti-tank weapons are displaying deadly efficiency, as are Bayraktar drones. But maybe other factors are involved as well?

Two additional dynamics (in addition to technology) can be named:

Firstly, Ukraine’s defenders are highly motivated because they are defending their territory against an obviously malevolent invader. Their wrath and purpose are amplified by grotesque images from Mariupol, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and most recently — Kyiv. But most Ukrainians have never been to many of these places: idealism (the “imagined community” of Ukraine) and identity are at play and are likely explanatory factors of success on the battlefield. The fact that this invader is historically and linguistically “close” serves to intensify Ukrainians’ rage: the death and destruction russia has caused must be avenged as a matter of principle.

Secondly, in addition to non-material motivation, there is the structural/organizational aspect of Ukraine’s defense. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are fielding small teams of 15–20 men against large mechanized units of the russian army. The small units can approach the enemy undetected, causing havoc to the large invading columns of tanks, armored vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems etc. These are regularly destroyed by small autonomous units whose tactics seem to be more akin to hunting than to traditional ground force combat. The same “flat” autonomous structures characterize the logistics networks and the volunteer support groups that enable the effectiveness of Ukraine’s frontline forces.

So, we have identified three factors contributing to Ukraine’s unexpected success against russia during the early stages of the war. These three dynamics also explain the Ukrainians’ success in inflicting unprecedented losses on the russian army.

These are:

1) Technology (portable highly lethal weaponry)

2) Identity (idealistic motivation / morale)

3) Organizational structure (small teams vs. large hierarchic units)

The secret of Ukraine’s success lies in the combination of these three factors.

However, as a social scientist one always wants to establish the “prime mover”: which factor is the foundation? Which is most important?

The answer to this question will reflect one’s preference for one of three traditions in social theory which I’ve grouped according to their main authors: Marx, Weber, Durkheim (and Bourdieu):

According to Marx, Ukraine is winning this war because technological (scientific) progress has enabled the development of weapons that can effectively be used by small field units to stop a much larger invading army. This “small is effective” myth will in the future serve to legitimate the production of more high-tech weaponry by the core capitalist economies.

Put in theoretical (generalized) terms: technology affects structure which is then legitimated by ideas.

The contrasting view is that of Weber: Ukrainians have a deeply rooted identity that has been wounded by the russians. Because this identity has never been consolidated, Ukrainians naturally have banded together in small groups (rather than in a large institutionalized hierarchic army) and have taken advantage of the technological tools on offer.

For Weberians the explanation is always: ideas determine structures that then utilize technology or innovate as needed.

A much less popular (in the Anglo-Saxon world) approach to understanding Ukrainians’ success would follow the French sociologists Emile Durkheim and/or Pierre Bourdieu. According to this approach we start with analyzing how Ukrainians ensure solidarity (i.e. how they organize / structure their activities). Answer: in small heterarchic groups. Then we look at the dominant ideas and practices (“habitus”) of these groups. Together, these define the structural-cultural system (or “field”). The effectiveness of technology depends upon its fit with the field. In the Ukrainians’ case: Javelins, NLAW, Stuhna and other weapons have matched perfectly with their “habitus” and have translated into unprecedented success on the battlefield.

So a “French” sociological explanation would state: structures meld with ideas to produce predominant practices; technological solutions are mounted on this foundation more/less effectively.

To all colleagues from sociology, please excuse the above extreme simplification of the “masters” of our field. I am well aware of Giddens (useless in this case: our “structures are not constantly structuring”) and Parsons (whose purpose was to explain systemic stability, not rapid change), and many others (Sztompka, Archer, Boudon, Latoure…).

My point is to focus non-specialists thinking:

If you believe Ukraine has been successful against the russian invader because the Ukrainians have access to technologically superior weapons (Stinger, Javelin, NLaW, etc.), you may proudly call yourself a Marxist.

If you believe Ukraine has been successful against the russian invader because Ukrainians have mobilized around their newfound identity (suddenly overcoming many years of ethno-linguistic regional cleavages about which thousands of pages have been written), consider yourself Weberian.

If you believe Ukraine has been successful against the russian invader because its society is naturally organized in small teams, and that Ukrainians’ anti-hierarchical (leaderless) practices have proved radically more effective in employing modern technology than the better equipped and more formally organized russians, you are (like me), a fan of Bourdieu and French sociology.

In the meantime — Слава Україні!

#ThoughtsfromKyiv

Valerii Pekar: The value crises in the rf occurred on March 8-12, 1169. March 21

People tend to speak about the value crisis in the rf at the level of a humanitarian catastrophe (humanitarian catastrophe is not just when there is no food and water, but also when humans massively lose their human image and dignity, in spite of food and water availability).

So, a humanitarian catastrophe occurred there not on February 24, 2002 and even not in the spring of 2014. And even not in 2000 when putin came to power, and even not when stalin came to power. And even not in 1550-1570 when moscovia became the empire on invading the lands of other peoples. And not even in 1477-1478 when it defeated Novhorod that embodied the European development path of the northern lands.

The date of the commencement of this catastrophe is well-known: March 8-12, 1169, when the army of the Prince of Suzdal andrey bogolyubsky (called by russian historian klyuchevsky the first prince of the moscovites), on invading Kyiv, destroyed and looted it. By that time it was not a common practice to behave like this in Rus’ in any conflicts, since “own” towns and cities are designed for possession, and not for looting. All the more when Kyiv was meant – a dream to rule for many generations of rulers. Humilyov is of the opinion that the order on looting of own city testifies to the appearance of the feeling that the eternal values of Rus’, its capital, and people were alien. Since that time the paths went in different directions, and that was long before the arrival of Tatars and Lithuanians.

It was in those times, as described in raptures by klyuchevsky, that “the great russian man entered the historical stage for the first time.”

He entered the historical arena in Kyiv, so in Kyiv he will leave it. Or, in the suburbs of Kyiv, to be more specific.

Mychailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. March 22 

When will the war end? This (or a variant) is the most common question I am asked lately by western journalists and by international friends. The only person able to answer that question authoritatively is vladimir putin, and I am certainly not his psychotherapist, but here are some thoughts.

Yesterday, according to rumors that are circulating in social media, the russian president held an online meeting with his Defense Minister (shoygu), Chief of Defense Staff (gerasimov), National Security Council Secretary (patrushev) and fsb Head (bortnikov). Apparently, when gerasimov reported to his boss that personnel losses sustained by the russian army in Ukraine were “significant,” putin interrupted stating that nothing of significance had yet been lost. It appears that during this meeting putin stated his readiness to lose up to 50 thousand soldiers in this war. Again, according to the unconfirmed report, the meeting ended with the russian president ordering “victory” (i.e. capitulation of Ukraine to be achieved) by May 7.

The date May 7 is significant for several reasons: firstly, it is putin’s inauguration day. His first inauguration as president of russia occurred May 7, 2000. He held the office until May 7, 2008 when dmitriy medvedev formally replaced his boss for four years (putin was Prime Minister 2008–2012) until the next inauguration on May 7, 2012. putin’s fourth term as President of the russian federation began on May 7, 2018.

Also, May 7 is two days shy of May 9 — Victory Day. Whereas the civilized world remembers the horrors of World War II on May 8, in russia, the tradition of marking “victory” in that war (not remembrance) continued after the collapse of the ussr. Indeed, the pomp and ceremony associated with this day (including the requisite military parade on Red Square) has been augmented under putin.

If the rumors are true, then the russian leader plans to celebrate “victory” in Ukraine as part of this year’s Victory Day celebrations. The only problem with this plan is that there is not going to be a victory in Ukraine.

The best that putin can hope for is for Mariupol to fall during the next week, and that he will be able to shift some of his forces from attacking that city to the assault on Kyiv. At most, this reinforcement will involve 3 or 4 Battalion-Tactical Groups (no more than 5000 men) which is unlikely to be enough to make a significant difference. The rest of russia’s forces in the south will have to stay there to maintain control over the very hostile local population.

Theoretically, reserves from other regions of russia could be thrown into battle in Ukraine (including conscripts) but given the performance of the russian “first echelon” (supposedly their best troops), it is doubtful that such a move would cause serious problems for the defenders of Kyiv. russia has seemingly endless amounts of military equipment on offer, but tanks, APC’s, Grad MLRS, etc. need qualified and motivated troops to operate them. And that’s a problem.

The option of enticing the belarusian army into the fray is also a non-starter. The belarusians are refusing to fight in Ukraine. A Syrian/Lebanese/Iranian contingent is reportedly on the way, but their motivation to fight and die in Ukraine for putin is likely to be equally low.

Given the morale problems experienced by the russian army around Kyiv, and their fatigue, even if russian supply problems can be resolved, and some reinforcements inserted, any potential renewed ground invasion of Ukraine’s capital is unlikely to be any more successful than what we’ve seen since 24 February.

Bellingcat’s Christo Groziev optimistically stated today that russia has sufficient resources to wage war only until the end of this week. I’d like to believe him, but I fear that this assessment is based on an overly humanist evaluation of the kremlin. If people don’t matter (including both russian soldiers and Ukrainian civillians), then resources may be stretched further.

With a halted ground assault, russia’s commanders will continue their current strategy of indiscriminate bombing and destruction of Ukraine’s cities. Their military goal seems to involve weakening defenses by trapping civilians in urban areas (no humanitarian corridors for evacuation allowed). Civilians consume food, fuel and resources that potentially could be used to nourish defenders. According to this doctrine, in time, attrition should result in a loss of will and ability to fight.

The russian strategy only works if a city can be surrounded and cut off from external supply. That has occurred in Mariupol, and after almost three weeks of siege, the battle (and human catastrophe) may soon be in its closing act. However, Kharkiv is not surrounded. Kyiv is far from being surrounded. Kryvyi Rih in the south is impossible to surround (it’s 126 km in length). Even Chernihiv and Sumy in the north, which (theoretically) were on the verge of being surrounded several weeks ago, are receiving supplies and continue to resist.

Given the dire strategic situation that russia’s commanders find themselves in, putin’s order (if real) that “victory” is to be secured by May 7 will be impossible to fulfil. That is likely to become evident even to the kremlin (and to its leader sitting in his bunker in the Urals) within 2–3 weeks. During this timeframe we will probably see one more attempted (and failed) “push” on Kyiv, and a great deal more bombardment of Ukraine’s cities by missiles and airstrikes. The humanitarian catastrophe will continue.

When putin finally realizes that the ground war is lost, he will escalate. I have written about this prospect before and will not repeat myself here. The “escalation moment” is likely come before the middle of April — in time for Easter. Previously I was convinced escalation would come sooner, but clearly the russian military command is convinced that a miraculous ground victory may yet be achieved.

Now a few words on the “peace talks” and the chatter around the possible “neutrality” of Ukraine and other supposed “concessions” being discussed (seemingly seriously in a variety of “expert” milieus.

Firstly, the current “negotiations” (daily conversations between representatives of the Ukrainian and russian presidential administrations) cannot possibly lead to a lasting peace because putin is not directly involved. russia is an authoritarian hierarchy where key decisions — e.g. to wage war and to end war — depend exclusively on the decisions of one man.

Secondly, lasting peace between russia and Ukraine will only be possible after putin’s removal from office. Cease fires may be negotiated by putin, but these will be temporary. The russian president has made it manifestly clear that he does not recognize Ukraine’s right to exist (in any “status” — neutral or otherwise). Therefore, he will not agree to any “peace” that allows for the continued existence of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukrainians want to exist. That does not leave much room for compromise (quote taken from Kyiv-native Golda Meir).

Thirdly, the goal of russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not to prevent NATO enlargement eastward. putin’s purpose is to finally “solve the Ukrainian question” (a new incarnation of the “final solution”). Ukraine’s future status as a (non)member of any alliance does not serve that end. Its discussion is a diversion from the main theme of the war.

As I stated in a previous post, latest opinion polls in Ukraine show 93% of respondents prepared to continue fighting until russia has withdrawn its forces from all of Ukraine. The day that happens, the war will be over.

Until then, we have a war to win!

#ThoughtsfromKyiv

Valerii Pekar: It is very difficult to overcome a storm, but it becomes even more difficult when a great calm replaces the storm. March 22

I will write something you will not come to like, but I have to write this, I actually was supposed to do this already several days ago, but somehow postponed it.

Now we will live through a psychologically tough period of switching from quick time to slow time.

We have been living for a month in the quick-time mode, many different events happened on a daily basis, the situation was changing from day to day, the news feed was full of different messages hastily following each other. We all lived in the high-energy mode, “on adrenaline:” both the ones at war and those who are volunteers, those who have left and those who have stayed. A person in this mode can work a lot, without any sleep, do incredible things following a fascinatingly intense schedule. They say such regime does not operate for long, burnout comes, but, in fact, one may live in this way even for quite long if the outer world is sending the respective signals.

And the outer world kept sending the respective signals in the form of hardly manageable event flow. When there are many events, that sets the pace for the brain to work, and, finally, for the whole body.

And now the situation is changing. The enemy’s troops already have no power and resources for active attacks. Even the reserves of bombs and missiles, aircraft and pilots for the total war on civilians will sooner or later start getting exhausted. And, at some time, we realize that the pace of the events has gone considerably down. Almost no news, and the news coming is almost the same from day to day. Some uncertain negotiations are going on, but every time they finish with a cheerful report “No special progress has been made in the negotiations today, the next meeting will be held tomorrow.”

But our subconsciousness reacts before our consciousness does, and on a deeper level. It gives the body the command to breathe out, for it not to die of tension. But our consciousness is not ready to breathe out. And that is a tricky point.

There is a large switch between quick- and slow-time mode somewhere in heaven, and it is now creaking to change to the slow-time mode. Those who attended the Maidan or actively participated in the events of 2014 know that I am talking about.

It is very difficult to overcome a storm, but it becomes even more difficult when a great calm replaces the storm. Over this slow period all types of “treasons,” conflicts and strife that used to be sleeping during the storm wake up, and they can tear to pieces the consciousness of an individual or the whole society in general.

Spring is transforming into a marathon, to put it mildly. And rules are different, breathing, way of thinking and life are different there.

But it is difficult to switch, so those who are covering the second kilometer at the pace of the hundred will not live up to the third kilometer. And the third kilometer is just the beginning …

Let me add a citation from Alex Ruban:

“We are approaching the phase runners call a second wind. All those going in for running know that this stage is preceded by the pain in the breast, muscles, some dizziness, willingness to stop and the feeling that even a mouth wide open is not enough to breathe. For a well-trained athlete this phase is desirable since he knows that it’s going to become easier after it … For an untrained one it may evoke fright since the feelings resemble panic resulting from shortage of air.”

I don’t mean that the war will last long. I don’t mean that the war will be short. I am not speaking about war, I am speaking about your “breath.” Finally, victory is not yet the end of our marathon. We will still need to rebuild the country and to pull out the bear’s teeth.

Therefore, dear friends, start switching to the marathon. Set your mind and body, breathing and metabolism. If war finishes tomorrow, that will come as a pleasant bonus. And if it doesn’t, you will have enough power to survive. Mind that we were given 72 hours. And we are still here, while they are partially already in hell.

What helps:

1. Realization of the fact that time switching is a general process, not only happening to you, but to the whole society.
2. Understanding that you are not alone.
3. Believing in victory.
4. Being busy with daily affairs (different for everyone).
5. Saving energy by not wasting time on those who are not ready to hear you.
6. The picture of the future: personal, family, corporate, and national.
7. Self-care (“air hostess principle:” the mask should first be put on oneself); those who will not save themselves will not save either the country or the world.
8. Care for those who feel worse than you do.

Let me add another citation from Alex Ruban:

“- feel free to ask others for help,

– help others,

– find something good in everything,

– transform everything into the good,

– look under your feet,

– look upwards,

– listen to yourself,

– hear others,

– believe in the future,

– overcome the past”

And remember: a great switch in heaven will once turn to the quick-time mode once again, with sudden creaking. And at that time we should have energy resources.

The editorial “rule of small letters” or the “rule of disrespect for criminals” applies to all the words related to evil, like names and surnames of terrorists, war criminals, rapists, murderers, and torturers. They do not deserve being capitalized but shall be written in italics to stay in the focus of the readers’ attention. 

The programme “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” has been created by joint effort and with the financial support of the institution’s members of the Cultural Business Education Hub, the European Cultural Foundation, and BBK — the Regensburg Art and Culture Support Group from the Professional Association of Artists of Lower Bavaria/Upper Palatinate.

Authors: Volodymyr Yermolenko, Valerii Pekar, Mychailo Wynnyckyj

Translators (from Ukrainian): Halyna Bezukh (Volodymyr Yermolenko’s essay), Halyna Pekhnyk (Valerii Pekar’s essays) 

Illustrators: Nastya Gaydaenko (Volodymyr Yermolenko’s essay), Max Palenko (Valerii Pekar’s essays),  Christina Katrakis (Mychailo Wynnyckyj’s essay on March 21), Victoria Boyko (Mychailo Wynnyckyj’s essays on March 20 and March 22), plasticine panel by Olha Protasova

Copyeditors: Yuliia Moroz, Terra Friedman King

Proofreaders: Iryna Andrieieva, Tetiana Vorobtsova, Terra Friedman King

Content Editors: Maryna Korchaka, Natalia Babalyk

Program Directors: Julia Ovcharenko and Demyan Om Dyakiv-Slavitski