March 30-31, 2022 — Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Olena Stiazhkina, Valerii Pekar, Taras Prokhasko

Flash essays from the collection “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” tell about the insights, experiences, and beliefs of Ukrainians, which ignited their society in 2022, when the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine began.

The Cultural Hub community and curators carefully collected, translated, and illustrated these texts in order to capture the values ​​of Ukrainians — Freedoms, Bravery, Dignity, Responsibility, and Humour.

A series of publications in partnership with Chytomo introduces this collection to the English-speaking audience. Volume 9 continues to present the series. You can get acquainted with the previous collection here.

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. March 30

In war, initiative is important. So far in this war, the military initiative has been 100% with russia.

This may now (finally) be changing, and the opportunity of the moment seems to have been seized upon by Ukraine. Will it be seized by our western partners?

The path we’ve come down can be summarized as follows. russia attacked Ukraine. Their ground assault in the vicinity of Kyiv proved a disaster, but russian troops managed to gain control over significant swaths of land in southern Ukraine. Until very recently, Ukrainian forces there and in Mariupol, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Sumy have almost exclusively been on the defensive. Initiative was firmly with russia.

During recent weeks russia’s initiative has extended to indiscriminate bombing of Ukrainian cities. Multiple humanitarian disasters have been the result. Although a large proportion of russia’s cruise missiles have been intercepted en route to their targets (two days ago the Ukrainian side reported 62 shot down out of 70 fired), their ships in the Black Sea from which most of these weapons are fired (as well as launch sites in belarus) remain out of reach of the Ukrainian forces.

In the meantime, NATO and the leaders of the West have reacted to russia’s actions by providing Ukraine with weaponry and sanctioning the invader’s economy. These were not proactive measures. In each case, action was taken only in response to russian initiatives.

Repeatedly threatened by russia with retaliation if NATO troops engaged in Ukraine, western leaders have repeatedly emphasized that their soldiers would not be involved in the war either on the ground or in the air. These statements were seen in Ukraine and russia as not only reactive, but meek.

To be fair, russian threats against the West involve possible use of nuclear weapons — an eventuality that is clearly frightening to any leader. But even after more than a month of direct war in Ukraine and constant intimidation on the diplomatic front, what is to be done about russia’s long-term threat remains unclear. It would seem that in the West, no proactive russia policy exists.

Yesterday’s “peace” proposals, voiced by the Ukrainian delegation during the talks in Istanbul were an attempt to seize the initiative locally. While the russian delegation came to Turkey prepared only to repeat their delusional demands (“denazification,” “demilitarization” etc.), the Ukrainians caught them off guard.

Now apparently, Kyiv might consider renouncing its NATO membership ambitions in exchange for security guarantees from the member-states of the UN Security Council, and it might agree to promise to refrain from using force to renew its sovereignty over Crimea and the “L/DNR” regions. Of course, this would be provisional on russia removing its troops from all Ukrainian territories invaded on or after 24 February 2022.

In reality, Ukraine’s “concessions” are symbolic. Firstly, Ukraine’s NATO membership was never really a possibility because the alliance was not prepared to accept Ukraine into its ranks. Secondly, the details of the “security guarantees” that are to be provided to Ukraine have not been detailed by the supposed guarantors, and since such obligations would require ratification by all partner-country parliaments (plus a referendum in Ukraine), their practical realization is problematic at best. Thirdly, the forcible return of territories occupied by russia in 2014 was never on the table, so to promise not to do so costs Ukraine nothing.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainians grabbed the initiative. The next move is up to the kremlin and for the moment both the kremlin and the russian military seem to have paused. Their strategic objectives have proved obviously out of reach, and while their air power continues to destroy Ukraine’s cities, the purpose of this destruction (in the absence of the viable possibility of a ground assault) is unclear.

It would seem logical for this pause to be used by western leaders to define their proactive strategies as well. President Biden made an off-the-cuff remark during his visit to Poland last week, alluding that his preference would be putin’s removal from power. This was then backpedaled by White House spokesmen, and later the President clarified that regime change in russia was his personal preference, not US policy.

Too bad. Peaceful coexistence with a russian federation led by putin is obviously no longer possible. The primary aim of US policy must therefore be either to wait out the russian leader (i.e. continue to react to his initiatives) or to proactively encourage his downfall. A public declaration of regime change as the goal of US policy may not be politically possible at this time, but silence on the subject is also problematic: in order to seize initiative, one must have a concept of what one seeks, and in a democracy, such goals should be made public.

In other words, in order to map a proactive strategy one needs a vision of the future and then a path of how to get there. What kind of a relationship with russia does the West want after putin’s aggression is stopped? Will there be a russia to have a relationship with? What constitutes “victory” in this conflict?

The final question is easily answered for Ukraine: victory will be achieved when the last russian soldier leaves Ukrainian territory. But will this be enough for the West? Given the continued ability (and proven desire) of putin to intimidate NATO, removal of russian troops from Ukraine will not remove the russian threat to world peace.

Even if russian troops eventually leave Ukraine, in the medium and long term, a russian President who bases his power on the most destructive kind of nationalism and imperialistic ambitions will remain a permanent existential threat to Ukraine and to Europe. In other words, as distasteful as this may sound, regime change is not only in the West’s interests, it is the only option may lead to lasting peace in the region, and indeed worldwide. An end to this conflict can only be achieved when russia is not ruled by putin.

That realization is the first step to a proactive russia policy. Such a policy may follow the famous adage of Chinese philosopher-strategist Sun Tzu: “Wait Long by the River and the Bodies of Your Enemies Will Float By.” Although that may be unfortunate for Ukraine, it may be the only viable option for western leaders.

Indeed, to ask for more than proactive waiting from Ukraine’s western partners at this point seems unrealistic.

In the meantime, we Ukrainians have a war to win.

#ThoughtsfromKyiv

PS: 7 years ago my good friend Valerii Pekar and I wrote an article outlining a proactive russia strategy. This now seems more relevant than ever.

Olena Stiazhkina: Kyiv. March 30

Someone suggested counting Thursdays: with the war dragging on, the day count would thrash your ripped insides with its treacherously big numbers again and again. It hurts less when you count Thursdays. For example, it’s only the fifth Thursday tomorrow.

Between the second and the third Thursday, I discovered the sky. Between the third and the fourth one, I noticed the air. On the eve of the fifth one, I saw the streets. In Kyiv, just like in other cities, where the war is raging on the outskirts and you can come or leave by train, not through a humanitarian corridor, there are billboards still standing along the roads.

From the pre-war times: ads of children’s swimming classes and the concert of shufutinsky who looks very much like the late kobzon.

From the war times: “GLORY TO MARIUPOL!,” “THANK YOU, CHERNIHIV!,” “AT 5 AM ON 24 FEBRUARY 24, RUSSIA BOMBED KYIV,” “RUSSIAN WARSHIP, GO FUCK YOURSELF!,” “RUSSIAN SOLDIER! IT’S BETTER TO BE ALIVE IN CAPTIVITY THAN DEAD IN A RUT”.

My favorite is this one: “MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. 4.5.0”.

4.5.0. is a military code that translates to “everything is ok”.

Everything is ok. Our morning roll calls become shorter, made up of three numbers and three periods.

Between the fourth and the fifth Thursdays, it is 4.5.0. in Kyiv.

“Ok” does not mean quiet. Our artillery keeps shelling. “They work,” we say.

They work to make sure that the russian missiles flying from the direction of half-destroyed Bucha do not “de-nazify” us to death. In between the attacks on Kyiv, “the liberators” gobbled up an Alabai and bragged about it to their friend. Their friend approved of it. If they get sick of their army ration and gobble up one of their fellows next time, their friend would approve of it, too. Their friend is not putin. It’s the russian people killing, raping, looting, and — as we see now — gobbling up an Alabai.

***

I see the streets. And I constantly feel the taste of concrete in my mouth. I have never tried concrete. I haven’t even licked it. But I know for a fact that this is the way it tastes.

It turned out that hatred can have different flavors. Today, it’s concrete. Yesterday, it was the charred ruins.

The russian world — all flavors of hell.

Olena Stiazhkina: Kyiv. March 31

Hairdressers have reopened. Or, rather, barbershops have reopened. Kyiv wants to give haircuts to young men, first of all. The young women who did not have their braids cut going to war will slowly grow their hair longer — both for themselves and those young men.

The prices in barbershops are flexible: the military can get a haircut for free; the volunteers can get it for free, too, but if they have money, they’re welcome to pay as little or as much as they can afford. All others have three options to choose from: 400, 500, or 800 hryvnias. Half of it will be donated to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

When the hairdressers reopen, I will ask for a one-centimeter trim every week. Half of the money I pay will go toward the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the other half — toward supporting the local economy. My hair is forty centimeters long, and I really hope I won’t end up bald until victory.   

***

Geography hurts. The geography of Ukraine — under-learned, skipped, forgotten since the long-gone school days — is hurting me now.

Instead of symbols for mineral resources, rivers, lakes, ravines, steppes, and forests, there are bloody symbols of missile and bomb strikes on the map.

The name of every village, town, and city becomes deeply ingrained in memory and will hurt for decades.

Myсhailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv. March 31

I continue to think about identity issues. Identity is a powerful motivator. In the words of Benedict Anderson, it involves “imagining” a community (commonality). In other words, individuals who may not know each other, and objectively may be quite different from each other, imagine themselves to be similar to others who claim the same identity. And this identity claim is one of the strongest motivators of collective action.

Identity markers are not always objectively definable. For example, the russians mistakenly assumed that all individuals who speak their language identify with their state and their leader. In fact, nothing could have motivated Ukrainians to fight more valiantly than an attack by russia on their demonstrably separate identity.

Identity is perpetuated (more or less effectively) through myths and archetypes that are propagated not only for internal consumption, but also as a means of differentiating in-group from out-group. Symbols such as flags, crests and maps are important in this regard. Archetypical heroes or historical characters are also carriers of identity myths.

Identity archetypes are most powerful when they expresses an ideal, a value that is often not explainable in simple words. When found, these symbolic forms of shorthand are capable of moving mountains (or stopping massive ground assaults).

As I wrote in an earlier post, the “Ukrainian” identity construct has become consolidated exceptionally quickly during the past month domestically, and has simultaneously become a worldwide celebrity phenomenon. What it means to be Ukrainian remains complex and multifaceted, as it should be, and the archetypes associated with the Ukrainian identity continue to evolve as the war progresses.

During the first weeks of russia’s invasion Ukrainians were identified with the myth of Thermopylae where 300 brave Spartans (in 480 BC) are said to have delayed the advance of a massive Persian army on Greece. Their story was recorded by Herodotus, and therefore impacted our modern understanding of European history. Theirs was an act of sacrifice, of valor, of defiance in the face of overwhelming odds.

But the Spartans were all eventually killed.

In the words of the Ukrainian anthem: “Ukraine’s glory and freedom are not yet dead!” We are not Spartans.

For ourselves we are Cossacks: freedom-loving, anarchic (we say “democratic”), warriors who will accept no ruler but their own (and even that is often problematic). Cossacks/Kozaks defend their land righteously against all invaders, and incidentally, they’re spectacular dancers.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Cossack archetype accurately reflects both the current situation in Ukraine and the values complex of Ukrainians identify with historically, few in the West understand it. At best, for educated non-Ukrainians its imagery conjures up Yul Brenner’s character in the film “Taras Bulba,” or the famous painting by Illya Repin of the Zaporozhians writing their letter to the Sultan. For many western Europeans, I suspect Cossacks are not even necessarily associated with Ukraine, but rather with the “eastern steppe” or European borderlands. In other words, Cossacks are very distant from the mainstream of western culture.

In the absence of an identifiable historical (or mythological) archetype for “Ukrainian” western media has filled the vacuum with a stylized Zelensky. Many in Ukraine find this image somewhat strange, but acceptable in the short term. After-all we also liked it when foreigners identified us with Shevchenko (the football star), with Klitschko, with Lomachenko, with Yushchenko …

Approximately a month ago, the image of the beehive became popular in social media as a symbol of Ukrainian resistance. Hives are identified by their queens — at least to the outside world. I guess Zelensky is ours.

In time, bees die; queens can be replaced. But the hive lives! And so it is with personified archetypes.

This war has produced and will continue to produce new Ukrainian heroes. In the future, streets will be named after Roman Hrybov — author of the legendary “dialog” between the defenders of Zmiyinniy Island and the attacking russian ship. Videogames will be produced based on the theme of the “Ghost of Kyiv” — the mythical MiG-29 pilot who has shot down countless enemy aircraft. I suspect a statue or two of Zelensky and Zaluzhny (Ukraine’s Chief of Staff) or Reznikov (Minister of Defense) may appear…

Personified heroes are all important avenues for communicating the values of who we are as Ukrainians. But personal archetypes and historical myths are not enough. In this war we have demonstrated to ourselves and to the world who we are as warriors, heroes, volunteers, “bees”…

I remember the days immediately following the end of the Maidan protests in 2014: the recently burned out hull of the Trade Unions Building in Kyiv’s city-center was draped in a massive banner that read “Freedom is our Religion.” At the time, that slogan didn’t work for me. After-all, the Revolution of Dignity had been about Dignity, Solidarity, National Identity, fighting corruption… Freedom was an important value, but not central to the protest movement.

Today, I realize that the slogan “Kyiv is the capital of freedom!” is exactly what this past month has been about. We are the new frontier: the place where despite “the Rockets’ red glare, the Bombs bursting in air… our flag IS still here!”

I sincerely hope (indeed I’m sure of it), that when this war ends, freedom-loving people from all over the world will flock to Kyiv (and to other Ukrainian cities) to learn how/why/who these strange freedom-loving Ukrainians really are.

Two and a half centuries ago “liberty” was the rallying cry for the mobilization of men and women on another continent. There, on the frontier of civilization, simple farmers, settlers of a strange and uncompromising land, fought not only for their independence, but for new ideals. Based on these, they created a republican system of government which (for all its faults) became the model for nation-states throughout Europe and the world. And their country (and identity) became a magnet.

Today, Ukraine is what America was in the late 18th century. Two hundred years from now (perhaps) Ukraine will too be condemned for not doing enough to support those who stand for the values of freedom; it may well also be the object of blame for much of what is wrong with the world. But today, as America was then, Ukraine is the place where novelty is born. And that novelty is embodied in a very old word: freedom.

We will build a new nation on the ashes of that which has been destroyed by the invader. We will generate new symbols, new archetypes, new heroes for all the world to admire and emulate. Because the basis of our fight is a very simple human desire: to be free.

When the war ends, the land of Cossacks, bees, and unlikely modest heroes who fought off an invasion by (supposedly) the most powerful army in Europe will be recognized for what it is: planet Earth’s Capital of Freedom — a place where freedom reigns, where symbols of what it truly means to be human become instantiated in real people, and where civilization moves forward.

God help us!

#ThoughtsfromKyiv

Valerii Pekar: Consciousness is an important battlefield. March 31

If everybody has already expressed their ideas about negotiations*, may I do it now? I have been waiting for quite a long period for my turn to come.

I would like to take a citation from a famous classic of modern Ukrainian literature Les’ Podervianskyi as an epigraph to my post: “I do not believe in the power of words, but I believe in the power of kicking one’s ass!”

We are dealing with the enemy who has not cared for any agreements and has been using all the agreements in the latrines. The history of this issue can be studied starting with the Pereyaslav Agreement and up to the Budapest Memorandum. Herman Pirchner in his book “Post putin” (I really advise you to read it!) gives the data of the analysis made by the American Foreign Policy Council as of 2018, which shows that out of 58 key international agreements signed by the rf, it has breached 36.

The rf is the legal successor of the ussr in international relations and is following a simple principle: only power matters, while agreements are good for nothing, they are just an element of self-comfort for weak people. (By the way, all talks about “reduced intensity of military actions,” as you understand, have quickly turned out to be deceitful, while “withdrawal” — just regrouping. Do not believe the rf’s diplomats. Please.)

And one more thing: the empire always comes back to deal a blow on the back. The Empire strikes back. The first russian-Chechen war (russian war against Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. — Program Director note) finished with Khasavyurt Accord for the empire to accumulate some power for the Second russian-Chechen war (russian war against Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. — Program Director note). (Do not trust any agreements with the rf. Ever. Please)

That is why, dear friends and enemies, please, bear this in mind, not to have to repeat this again in several days: the core negotiation process is the one held by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the core negotiator on our side are the unbeatable warriors of all types and sorts of troops. And they are shaping up the agenda for all the other negotiation platforms. Diplomacy is important, but it performs the function of an auxiliary type of troops, like cover from the air (the same as cyber army, if you allow for my metaphor, covering the front from under the ground).

So what has happened in Istanbul then? In terms of negotiations?

First of all, let me mention that real negotiation starts when the parties have some points of intersection in their outlined standpoints. For example, you are bargaining for something in the Turkish market and are ready to pay 100 Euros, while the seller wants to get 10,000 Euros. These are already negotiations, you have a point of intersection since theoretically you are ready to buy, while he is ready to sell, and it’s only the matter of price. But if you want to buy his house, and he is ready to sell only the carpet, there will be no negotiations, no matter how much tea you drink together.

The Ukrainian standpoint at the negotiations starts with unconditional withdrawal of russian troops. russian position at the negotiations starts with unconditional refusal to withdraw its troops. So, here we are, there’s nothing to speak about. The fate of ordlo (breakaway areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions), Crimea, NATO and the planet of Mars can be discussed as much as you wish, but it is pointless — the positions of the parties do not have any point of contact or intersection.

Let me remind you of the words of our great compatriot Golda Meir: “We intend to remain alive. Our neighbors want to see us dead. This is not a question that leaves much room for compromise.”

Why all this then?

The negotiations are being watched. The rf wants to produce the impression on the West that it is ready for negotiations, just to suspend imposition of sanctions as well as to win time, to gather the operational reserve, re-group, transfer the troops to the areas of the key future attacks. Ukraine should also participate in the negotiation process not to be blamed for refusing to hold negotiations. And the West insists on the negotiations since it wants all this to stop for the world to get back to its previous lifestyle, business as usual (spoiler: that will not happen anyway).

But there are two more audiences watching the negotiations — internal russian and internal Ukrainian ones. Since that is all happening not in the 20th, but in the 21st century, in the post-modern epoch, when the second main front is in the conscience of citizens of the countries at war (and not at war).

The response of the russian society to negotiations makes me filled with joy. They consider any negotiations to be a path for weak men, for them to start a negotiation means to publicly recognize the weakness of their country. And that means that either their leader is weak and should be replaced (just recall: in the “red” management culture a leader is allowed to make a mistake only once), or he has been deceived (so, you need to find and liquidate the traitors). Now it is all in flames. Burn bright.

The response of the Ukrainian society to the negotiations makes me sad. Just several days ago, in our scenario analysis, we envisaged a similar situation and were trying to prevent it. Unfortunately, that did not happen.

Educated and smart people, first of all, have made logical mistakes taught not to be made in the first year of studies. Secondly, we have forgotten about the Constitution [of Ukraine]. When I read that [advisor to the head of the Office of the President, Mykhailo] Podolyak has finally drained the Crimea, I get a number of questions, the first of which is as follows: can Podolyak really drain the Crimea? Can an international treaty come into effect if it is concluded not in compliance with the constitutional procedure? Can the leaders of the Ukrainian state do something that would be absolutely unacceptable for most citizens?

Any results of negotiations must be accepted by the higher authorities of the country. In the rf this is about putin — he is reported about everything, and he either agrees, or not. In Ukraine that is the Ukrainian people. Thank God, these are not just the words in the Constitution, but a fact of life.

But.

This is the war of systems, and the first to “start shattering” loses. If the russian society is the first to start shattering — they have lost (spoiler: it will happen so). Our task is not to shatter. They will keep swaying us. And we will be swaying them. Those who are the first to go dizzy lose. Your primary contribution to our victory is not to allow you to sway you.

Pay attention to the fact that I am not declaring trust in our negotiators or political leaders. I do not trust any personalia (but for friends). Victory is ensured not by personalia, but by institutions. I trust the Armed Forces [of Ukraine] that determine the agenda of negotiations, and the Constitution of Ukraine that determines the procedure of fixing their results.

Overwhelming response to negotiations is a part of stress caused by transition to slow-time mode. Therefore, if you want to shout “we are drained!” or “treason!,” first you need to breathe out and have a look at the sky, and then recall that the main negotiator is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the situation at that main negotiation is changing from day to day.

An important battlefield is conscience, and in it each and everyone is responsible for the protection of their small fragment, for the enemy’s foot not to trample it.

Taras Prokhasko: Good God! March 31

Finally, was I asked the question about the most important thing – when did you decide you needed to start writing in Ukrainian? 

She was a highly thoughtful German journalist who realized that Ukraine had emerged recently, and that the Ukraine had some imaginary language conceived, but the government policy went to support that flight of fantasy and denied every possibility to speak and write in the native and obscene russian language, a new feudal villainy state. What do you do in case of such a tolerant interaction? Should you rage or start explaining in detail about our generational memory? What would be better to do? What could have a more useful impact?

How do I explain to them that over my entire life, neither me, nor thousands of other men of letters (even the hopelessly soviet ones) have never written any word in other than Ukrainian? Moreover, the letters from gulag were also written in Ukrainian. How could one comprehend the pragmatic thing that all our invaders would repetend the same thing: Ukrainian is the compromised russian, Polish, Romanian, and (glory be!) Magyar flawed by others, by their general staff and intelligence services with thousands of paid agents. How shall one understand the operations of entire Ministries in charge of, for example, Romanization, who would cleanse the poor Ruthenians from the horrible viral pest of their own language.

Not until now, it has become clear that the presence and the vibrant evolution of this language became a determinant to believing in the isolatedness and possibility of our own future happening in the context of this linguistic scape.

Halychyna illustrated it long time ago. The solid fabric of Ukrainian speaking caused even the most deep-rooted newcomers to gradually transition into locals. That was the landscape. That was the everyday life. That was the social pact of co-habitation enshrined with the wordings of the Ukrainian language.

It turned out that the linguistic identity did manage to create at least some foundation, even if shaky. The very contact with the alchemy of the Ukrainian language managed to develop a certain sign system you cannot deny. Not to mention phonetics that is stronger than air raid alerts; or the syntax that implies softness down to the hardness of residue. And the vocabulary hinging on a totally different reality.

The fact that we did not have to decide to start writing in Ukrainian when it was allowed, and that people who refused to speak Ukrainian at some point still continued to hear it every day, in its best versions, shaped the deepest cause for the war. Furthermore, this will eventually become the critical factor for the victory.

Oddly enough but the present great warfare continues also for the sake of Ukrainian literature to exist, to have Ukrainian, with all its bureaucratic cliches, pidgins, and dialects, sound around; to make sure no one has a chance to establish any new ministry for de-Ukrainization.

The editorial “rule of small letters” or the “rule of disrespect for criminals” applies to all the words related to evil, like names and surnames of terrorists, war criminals, rapists, murderers, and torturers. They do not deserve being capitalized but shall be written in italics to stay in the focus of the readers’ attention. 

The program “Wars. Ukrainians. Humanity” has been created by joint effort and with the financial support of the institution’s members of the Cultural Business Education Hub, the European Cultural Foundation, and BBK — the Regensburg Art and Culture Support Group from the Professional Association of Artists of Lower Bavaria/Upper Palatinate.

Authors: Mychailo Wynnyckyj, Olena Stiazhkina, Valerii Pekar, Taras Prokhasko 

Translators (from Ukrainian): Hanna Leliv (Olena Stiazhkina’s essays), Halyna Pekhnyk (Valerii Pekar’s essay), Svitlana Bregman (Taras Prokhasko’s essay)

Illustrators: Victoria Boyko (Mychailo Wynnycky & Olena Stiazhkina’s essays), Max Palenko (Valerii Pekar’s essay), Yuliya Tabenska (Taras Prokhasko’s essay), and plasticine panel by Olha Protasova

Copyeditors: Yuliia Moroz, Terra Friedman King

Proofreaders: Iryna Andrieieva, Tetiana Vorobtsova, Terra Friedman King

Content Editors: Maryna Korchaka, Natalia Babalyk

Program Directors: Julia Ovcharenko and Demyan Om Dyakiv-Slavitski