Andreas Umland: The war on Ukraine makes a Russian breakup more plausible

Andreas Umland is a German political scientist born in 1967, a very vocal advocacy voice, specializing in contemporary Russian and Ukrainian history, as well as regime transitions. He holds a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Cambridge and a Dr.Phil. in History from the Free University of Berlin. Umland is an Associate Professor of Politics at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. 

He is incredibly productive—he publishes stacks of articles every week, which sometimes forces me to “unsubscribe” from Academia just to keep from getting overwhelmed. Simultaneously, he has worked at various institutions, including Oxford, Stanford, and Harvard, and is the founder and editor of the ibidem Press book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” and “Ukrainian Voices.” His work focuses on post-Soviet extreme right movements, European fascism, and East European geopolitics.

In this conversation — a bit less about literature — we talk about keenly political insights, as Umland not only writes on a daily basis, but he is happy to share his incredibly deep expertise on the region. In a nutshell — this was a unique chance to ask all those questions we all dare not talk about. And to validate the reality of some political dreams, I simply couldn’t resist asking about them.  

Chytomo: Let’s start with your background. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, we launched the “Dialogues on War” project with PEN. One of the biggest challenges was shifting perspectives from a Russian to a Ukrainian viewpoint. Many still see Ukraine through a Russian lens, partly because Slavic studies are usually based on Russian perspectives.

You have a unique background, transitioning from Russian studies to advocating for a Ukrainian perspective in politics. Could you share your career journey and how you arrived at this point?

Andreas Umland: My interest in Russian politics began early, focusing on Russian ultra-nationalism. This was partly due to my German background and the realization in the late 1980s and 1990s that the Soviet Union’s breakup would be more complicated than anticipated. My academic work, including two dissertations and a master’s thesis, centered on Russian fascists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Alexander Dugin. I was intrigued by the sources of aggressiveness and the risks facing young Russian democracy in the 1990s.

There was a genuine attempt by some to democratize and de-imperialize Russia, aiming to create a Russian nation-state akin to a normal European country. However, these efforts were in the minority, and the risk of failure was always present, similar to Germany’s Weimar Republic in the 1920s.

I noticed parallels between German and Russian developments in the 20th century, particularly in the rise of extremist ideologies. Initially, these groups were fringe, but they eventually entered the mainstream in Russia.

I came to Ukraine somewhat accidentally, taking a job here, and fell in love with the country, as many others have. I believe it’s crucial to understand the broader context of Russian thought and ideology, which predates Putin. This war is not just Putin’s; it’s rooted in long-standing Russian ideological developments. Putin implemented what was already present in Russian society—a desire to restore imperial glory, despite Russia’s internal challenges.

Chytomo: Isn’t there a risk that studying Russian culture, often through programs labeled as Slavic studies, can inadvertently turn students into ambassadors of Russian culture? I’ve noticed that many brilliant colleagues who have completed such programs seem to lack knowledge about other Slavic cultures, such as modern Polish literature from the 20th century.

Upon reviewing curricula, it appears that these programs often focus primarily on Russian perspectives, with limited coverage of other Slavic nations like Slovakia, Slovenia, or Czechia. This creates a vicious cycle where other cultures are marginalized. What are your thoughts on this issue? Do you think establishing separate Ukrainian studies programs could help counterbalance this by giving Ukraine more agency and visibility?

Andreas Umland: Yes, the non-recognition of Ukrainian culture, nationhood, and traditions is a significant problem that contributes to the ongoing war. This issue also affects other nations from the former tsarist and Soviet empires, as well as ethnic groups within Russia that are understudied and misunderstood.

On the other hand, those who study Russia can also make a useful contribution by focusing on Russian pan-Slavism, Eurasianism, fascism, and imperialism. These ideologies have been underestimated, often viewed as marginal or unimportant by many Russian specialists. Coming from Germany, I’ve seen how extremist ideologies can quickly become powerful and catastrophic, as witnessed in the 1930s. Therefore, I believe these ideologies should be studied seriously due to their potential impact.

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Given Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower and its influence on global politics, it’s surprising that more attention wasn’t paid to who holds power in Russia and how it’s used. In the 1990s, there was an opportunity for democratic development in Russia, but over the years I’ve become increasingly skeptical about whether this scenario was ever truly possible.

I’ve argued in several publications that there should be more research programs focused on Russian imperial nationalism. However, until recently, only a handful of people worldwide were deeply studying these topics. We organized a few seminars, but there was never a comprehensive research program dedicated to understanding the ideologies of figures like Dugin, Prokhanov, Glazyev, and many others.

The lack of attention to Ukrainian, Belarusian, and internal Russian ethnic histories was another parallel problem that contributed to the surprise when these issues escalated. If people had taken the writings of Dugin and Zhirinovsky seriously in the 1990s, they would have seen the groundwork for Putin’s actions. Unfortunately, these warnings were largely ignored.

Chytomo: I came across an old video on Instagram yesterday featuring a speech by Vladimir Zhirinovsky from about a decade ago. What struck me was how accurately he described recent events, making it seem as though he was commenting on current affairs, even though the speech was from years ago. It’s quite surreal, especially considering he passed away.

Andreas Umland: Yes, exactly. What makes it even more incredible is that Zhirinovsky didn’t know how events would unfold, yet he partly predicted what happened, including forming alliances with the U.S. and befriending a major leader. It’s remarkable how closely his words align with what has transpired.

Chytomo: I’ve noticed that Russian studies often romanticize Russia. For example, fans of Dostoyevsky’s “Crime and Punishment” often forget that Raskolnikov killed two people, including a woman with special needs, which challenges the romanticized view of class struggle.

Despite being justified as a way to “know your enemy,” Russian studies in the U.S. and Canada seem to have had the opposite effect. Even now, many struggle to understand the aggression coming from ordinary Russians. What are the sources of this aggression? Why do regular Russians often express such expansive ambitions, as seen in their desire for Russia to dominate globally?

Andreas Umland: Many people justify the war by claiming that Russia was provoked by actions in Washington, Brussels, Berlin, or Kyiv. However, if you study the last 500 years of Russian history, you’ll find that imperial expansion and pan-nationalist ideas are old themes. Understanding these historical patterns can help predict Russia’s current foreign policy without needing to focus on recent events in Europe or the U.S. Mainstream Russian historians and writers like Solzhenitsyn and Karamzin have discussed the issues driving Moscow’s foreign policies vis-a-vis Ukraine, Belarus and other countries.

There was a tendency among researchers to view Russia through either an anti-communist or pro-communist lens, often romanticizing it as exotic but not dangerous. Both perspectives were inadequate because they overlooked the core issue of Russia’s imperial tradition. Studying Russian history reveals the risk of such traditions resurfacing, which could have been recognized 30 years ago as potentially having catastrophic consequences.

My dissertation on Vladimir Zhirinovsky, among others, highlighted the political and not only intellectual importance of understanding extremist ideologies in Russia. Zhirinovsky’s support for the first Chechen war was pivotal, and his ideology played a significant role in shaping some of Russia’s political decisions. Despite his influence, he remains an understudied figure, with limited academic literature dedicated to him.

Chytomo: It’s remarkable that in Ukraine, Vladimir Zhirinovsky was often perceived as a clown, yet he was one of the few figures who spoke candidly without filters. Meanwhile, your work in the “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” series highlights key differences in how societies function. Specifically, there’s a stark contrast between Russia’s strongly hierarchical society and Ukraine’s more horizontal, aristocratic structure.

I recall a striking experience when I was a young PhD student visiting Moscow and St. Petersburg. During the early days of social media, I suggested creating a Facebook page to share links about niche conferences in Europe. A young woman in her 20s was surprised, saying that such initiatives should come from the Head of our aesthetic society, who was over 90 and had never used a computer. She expressed concern that this could be uncontrollable, highlighting the top-down approach in Russia.

This experience underscored the significant differences between our societies, which were often portrayed as similar “brother nations” during the Soviet era. As I grew older, I realized how distinct Ukraine and Russia truly are. What do you think are the historical or systemic reasons for these differences? Are they linked to our political systems or cultural narratives? How do you see these differences from your perspective?

Andreas Umland: From my perspective, there’s a growing body of research, primarily by Ukrainians, highlighting the differences between Russian and Ukrainian state and nation-building processes. For example, Andrew Wilson’s book “The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation” explores these differences, despite superficial similarities between Russians and Ukrainians. While I may not be the most qualified to speak on this, it aligns with my observations.

Before moving to Ukraine in 2002 to teach at Shevchenko University and Mohyla Academy, I spent two years working in Yekaterinburg with the Civic Education Project and Bosch Foundation at Ural State University. Yekaterinburg has a somewhat democratic tradition and is more pluralistic than other Russian cities. However, there’s still a strong hierarchy.

What you described about Ukraine’s semi-anarchic soul and networking ease resonates with me. Ukraine’s openness and lack of pretentiousness make it very attractive. When I first came to Kyiv, it was largely Russian-speaking, but I found it easy-going and welcoming. Over time, I’ve learned Ukrainian and observed that people from diverse backgrounds also feel at home here.

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I co-authored an article with Pavlo Klimkin about the shared post-colonial culture among East Europeans, including Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians, and Estonians. This common experience of being part of former empires sets them apart from nations with imperial traditions like Germany, Austria, France, Russia, Serbia, and Turkey.

My work includes founding in 2004 the scholarly book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society”, which now has almost 300 volumes. More excitingly, I’ve been working on the “Ukrainian Voices” series since 2019, which includes academic and non-academic works by journalists, artists, and others related to Ukraine. This series will soon reach 100 volumes.

Chytomo: That’s impressive. 

Andreas Umland: About 80 volumes in “Ukrainian Voices” are published or announced, and 20 more are in preparation. We should reach the 100th volume soon, possibly by the end of this year or in early 2026. The success of the older academic series SPPS is a testament to the ongoing interest in Soviet and post-Soviet politics and society. The series continues to cover a wide range of topics, from political extremism to civil society development, and we’re looking forward to publishing more insightful scholarly works in the future — including and especially on Ukraine.

Chytomo: That’s very interesting and useful for those studying Ukraine, especially since it involves primary sources from a diverse range of Ukrainian authors, including politicians. However, I wonder how many voters in elections will actually read such materials. My question is, how can we shift to this different perspective on a broader level? How can we make these insights more accessible and impactful for a wider audience?

Andreas Umland: The sales numbers for the books in the series are not as impressive as I had expected, despite the ongoing war. This might be partly due to the small German publisher, ibidem Press, which is efficient but not as well-known as larger publishers. Unlike many big German academic publishers, ibidem Press doesn’t charge authors thousands of euros to publish their work; they only occasionally charge for services like formatting, editing, and translating.

For several years now, ibidem Press has a partnership with Columbia University Press, which distributes the English volumes in SPPS and “Ukrainian Voices” globally. However, even with this collaboration, sales haven’t reached the hoped-for levels. While sales are increasing, they’re not yet selling in the thousands as anticipated.

As someone who isn’t directly involved in marketing or sales, my role is to create the content and supply for these series. Sometimes, having a wide range of available books can stimulate demand, especially when they receive reviews and attention from notable figures. This aspect of my work is exciting, though it’s more of a hobby. My main job is being an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies.

Chytomo: You’re incredibly productive, to the point where I once joked about blocking you on Academia due to the constant stream of new publications. Seeing over 80 volumes in the Ukrainian series can be overwhelming, but it’s essential for academic progress. Academia is notoriously slow, and having a substantial body of work is crucial for research validation, especially for PhDs. This extensive collection provides a solid foundation for future studies. Any tools or any ideas on what we can do better in this academic field? 

Andreas Umland: There is now some institutional development in Ukrainian studies, with new centers emerging. In my work, which is today more journalistic and analytical than academic, I try to integrate Ukrainian topics into broader discussions beyond East European or post-Soviet studies. I aim to get Ukrainian issues featured in general foreign affairs and politics journals, websites and newspapers, where Ukraine can be a case among many topics. This approach helps make Ukraine a part of general discussions among intellectuals, academics, and other analysts.

There are excellent outlets like The Kyiv Independent, Euromaidan Press, and New Eastern Europe, as well as academic journals from institutions like the Mohyla Academy, which are now indexed in Scopus. These are important for developing Ukrainian studies. But the real challenge is reaching a wider audience outside specialized fields.

Republishing existing texts in new settings, i.e., as parts of a collected volume, can be beneficial, even if some view it as not traditional academic work. For instance, an SPPS book by Tatiana Zhurzhenko composed of previously published articles won a book prize, showing that republished works can gain new relevance. Translations are also crucial, as they can make texts part of national discourses in other countries, attracting readers who might not have been interested in them otherwise.

Chytomo: You just gave me an idea I was considering earlier. For us, the low-hanging fruit might not be Eastern European studies but rather topics like security, civil society, and the military, which are currently very relevant and active areas in Ukraine. On a different note, do you have a good understanding of Ukrainian, and do you read Ukrainian literature?

Andreas Umland: I don’t read Ukrainian literature as much as I would like. Since the war began in 2014, I’ve struggled, in fact, to keep up with all academic literature in my field. One thing that helps is listening to academic audiobooks while walking or exercising, as it allows me to consume books I wouldn’t have time to read otherwise. Most analysts in Ukraine are today in a hectic mode, constantly producing content rather than focusing on personal intellectual development.

I do occasionally read Ukrainian literature, particularly poetry, which has become a way to express emotions during difficult times. I’ve been in touch with poets and have read some of their work recently. However, finding time for recreational reading is a challenge in Ukraine right now.

Chytomo: As someone who has spent a lot of time in Ukraine, do you feel that the country is in a survival mode? From a cultural studies perspective, I’ve always wondered how long a country can sustain this mode. Initially, the war disrupted creative work, and many people focused on volunteering. However, over time, Ukrainian literature seems to be flourishing, even if it’s not yet ready for major novels about the war. It likely needs more time to process these experiences. What is your perspective on this from the inside?

Andreas Umland: It’s surprising to see how people in Kyiv are managing to find a sense of normalcy and routine despite the ongoing war. Many analysts in the West are alarmed about Ukraine’s situation, but from my perspective, things are functioning relatively well. This winter, for instance, was the best in terms of electricity supply compared to the previous two years. Initially, there were issues in November and December, but by January and February, the situation improved. People came together to purchase generators and other equipment, which helped them cope with the challenges.

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Interestingly, some of these preparations turned out to be unnecessary, as the situation stabilized. It’s remarkable how resilient Ukrainians are, adapting to the new reality and finding ways to maintain a sense of routine. Even air raids have become somewhat normalized, with many people no longer seeking shelter. This resilience is a testament to the ability of Ukrainians to adapt and find ways to live with the ongoing conflict.

Chytomo: I recently returned from Stockholm after attending the Ukraine Vision Festival. When a motorcycle passed by, I instinctively jumped towards the nearest door because the sound reminded me of a Shahed drone. It’s fascinating how our subconscious can react to familiar sounds in unexpected ways. For instance, I couldn’t fully enjoy the beautiful fireworks in London for New Year’s because the sounds now evoke different associations.

Andreas Umland: I understand this problem well. In Ukraine, particularly in Kyiv, dealing with air raid alerts and other challenges becomes part of daily life. People cope by moving to a different room during alerts and trying not to let the constant pressure overwhelm them. They focus on daily activities and find moments to enjoy themselves despite the stress. This resilience is crucial for maintaining a sense of normalcy.

At the same time, cultural life in Kyiv continues. Services function, new developments emerge, and buildings rise. Life goes on, and it’s not always about the war. The war changes everything, affecting both professional and personal life in unforeseen ways. However, this new life isn’t solely defined by war and tragedy. It’s a different and complicated as well as tragic life, one where people adapt and find ways to live with the ongoing war.

Chytomo: Given your unique perspective as someone with a German background living in Kyiv, how do you see the evolving relationship between Ukraine and Germany in the coming years? Historically, Germany’s relationship with Russia has been complex and influential, but recent events have significantly altered this dynamic. What ideas do you have about how this shift might impact Ukraine-Germany relations, especially considering issues like corruption and political developments?

Andreas Umland: It’s frustrating to reflect on my past work opposing the Nord Stream projects. The idea of “Wandel durch Handel” (change through trade) was flawed, as it overlooked the consequences of entangling Germany and Russia with gas pipelines while freeing Russia from its dependence on Ukraine. This approach was based on peace theory, which suggests that trading nations are less likely to go to war. However, by creating new pipelines, we redirected gas flows from Ukraine to the Baltic Sea, effectively disengaging Ukraine from Russia. This was justified under the guise of securing peace in Europe, but it ultimately prepared the ground for conflict.

Fortunately, this approach has largely ended, and Russia’s reputation in Germany has suffered significantly. Despite lingering sympathies in Eastern Germany, where I’m from, the war’s escalation in 2022 was a major shock for Germany with deep consequences. I believe this will have lasting effects, including closer German-Ukrainian relations. With many Ukrainians now living in Germany and integrating into politics, academia, and journalism, I foresee a future where German-Ukrainian ties become even stronger. This shift could be influenced not only by changes in European dynamics but also by potential shifts in U.S. policies, which have traditionally been a cornerstone of Ukraine’s Western partnerships.

Chytomo: There was a provocative question I wanted to ask based on your research on comparative fascism. Do you see any parallels between historical fascist movements and current political trends? Given my past observations of the complex relationships between Germany and Russia, including the use of gaslighting tactics, I’m curious about your insights on whether similar dynamics are at play today…

Andreas Umland: Now, the situation has shifted to global politics, and recent developments in the U.S. are concerning. It’s challenging to take these events seriously, but they are real and happening. I recently wrote an article for Ukraińska Pravda and Western outlets comparing Ukraine in 2010 to the U.S. today. In 2010, Yanukovych came to power, and I speculate that Trump’s presidency might end similarly due to his disruptive policies, potentially leading to protests against his rule.

Regardless of Trump’s fate, I believe there will be a withdrawal of U.S. involvement from European affairs, including Eastern Europe. This marks the end of an era in American-European relations, which will also affect U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Historically, the U.S. has been a significant presence in Ukraine, with organizations like USAID, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute playing major roles in Ukraine’s development.

However, this is changing. European partners, particularly Germany, will become more important for Ukraine. Germany is well-positioned to take on this role due to its disillusionment with Russia and the presence of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians living there. My prediction for German-Ukrainian relations is thus positive, and I believe they could become Ukraine’s most important Western relationship in the future. Germany is the largest Western country after the U.S. and is geographically close, making it naturally a strategic partner for Ukraine.

Chytomo: Of course, Ukraine will also maintain close relationships with Poland and the Baltic countries. Recently, I witnessed something interesting in Sweden. There was a unique exhibition showcasing the Ukrainian-Swedish relationship, featuring exhibits like the Pylyp Orlyk Constitution, some items from Crimea, and Ottoman Empire artifacts, as well as official correspondence.

I was pleasantly surprised to hear similar sentiments expressed by Swedish politicians during a rally on the 24th. The Swedes are reflecting on these historical ties and bringing them into the present. They’re considering the need for new alliances in Europe, possibly with Scandinavian countries, the Baltic states, and Poland. In their discussions, they questioned whether France or Germany should be key partners, noting that these major players have not yet clearly sided with Ukraine. This process of forming new alliances is ongoing.

Andreas Umland: I’ve been pleasantly surprised by how closely the Scandinavian countries, including Sweden, have become partners with Ukraine. The financial support from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland is substantial, which is a welcome development. Additionally, the UK has become a strong supporter, despite having a significant Russian immigrant community. Great Britain has even signed a long-term partnership treaty with Ukraine, which I find encouraging.

It’s interesting to see these new partners, who are geographically and historically distant from Ukraine, becoming so invested. They are often more supportive than Ukraine’s neighbors like Slovakia and Hungary, who have complex domestic issues and seem to overlook their own historical conflicts with the Russian Empire.

Germany, being the largest economy in Europe and geographically close, naturally carries significant weight in this relationship. I hope that connections like a direct train from Kyiv to Berlin will be reestablished soon, as they once existed. Overall, I have an optimistic view of these developments.

Chytomo: Many in my circle believe that the only viable solution is not a ceasefire or peace talks but rather the dissolution of the Russian Federation. This would involve recognizing and acknowledging the indigenous peoples of Russia as separate entities. While this idea might seem far-fetched, modern history has shown that significant changes can occur rapidly. What is your opinion on this as an expert?

Andreas Umland: A few years ago, I wouldn’t have considered the breakup of Russia a realistic possibility, but with each passing month of war, it seems more plausible. The war is creating internal pathologies, regional disparities, and social tensions within the so-called Russian Federation, which could make it difficult for the state to maintain its territorial integrity.

Currently, Russia’s war economy allows people to cope, but this model is unsustainable and self-destructive. If a breaking point is reached, I question whether the Russian state can hold its territory together. The annexed Ukrainian territories, officially part of Russia, are unlikely to remain so. Additionally, regions like Kaliningrad Oblast, the Far East, and the North Caucasus pose challenges.

I can imagine a potential domino effect where economic crises, high inflation, and widespread discontent erodes support for Moscow. While structures like the federal government, army, and Ministry of Interior hold the state together, Putin’s actions are undermining these institutions. The war supports the regime now but is also depleting the state’s resources, leading to increased aggression and tension.

This could culminate in another collapse, following those of the Tsarist and Soviet Empires. The likelihood of Russia maintaining its current territory is gradually decreasing, making its breakup more probable, though still unpredictable.

Chytomo: That’s great to hear. Emotionally, the term “so-called Russian Federation” resonates differently for Ukrainians. As the editor of the Ukrainian Voices series, what perspectives or stories from Ukrainian authors do you think are most important for international audiences to hear right now? What can contribute to building and empowering the Ukrainian narrative or brand of Ukraine?

Andreas Umland: It’s difficult to pinpoint the most crucial stories for international audiences right now. Naturally, the war remains a central narrative, and I even issued a call for manuscripts on this topic for the book series “Ukrainian Voices” three years ago. However, I believe historical, cultural, and everyday life stories—whether related to the war or other conflicts—are equally important. Ukraine’s national minorities also offer valuable perspectives.

From a technical standpoint, one of the biggest challenges in publishing these works is producing high-quality translations. Professional translation is costly, and sales often don’t cover expenses. While programs like the Ukrainian Book Institute’s Translate Ukraine initiative help bridge this gap, funding limitations sometimes force unconventional approaches to translation. These methods are not ideal but ensure that important manuscripts are published rather than lost.

Republishing existing works in new contexts can also be effective, as seen with Tatiana Zhurzhenko’s mentioned SPPS book composed of previously published articles, which won a prize after being republished. Translations play a key role in reaching wider audiences, especially when adapted to readers’ native languages. This helps integrate Ukrainian narratives into global discussions and makes them part of national discourses abroad.

Chytomo: Ultimately, Ukrainian literature is evolving rapidly, even under challenging conditions. Poetry has emerged as a powerful medium for expressing emotions and processing trauma, resonating deeply with readers both locally and internationally. Given the unpredictable geopolitical climate, it’s challenging to predict the next trend. However, after our conversation, I can more clearly see potential in areas like civil society, security, and the military, as well as how people adapt to living under changing security conditions. As you mentioned, Kyiv remains a vibrant and lively place, where people are finding ways to survive and even thrive despite the challenges… 

Andreas Umland: And this resilience is truly remarkable and could play a crucial role in shaping future developments. The ability of Ukrainians to adapt and find ways to maintain a sense of normalcy and even humor despite the ongoing war is a testament to their strength and determination. Furthermore, this resilience can inspire international support and solidarity, as the world witnesses the courage and perseverance of the Ukrainian people.

Communities might develop new economic models or social structures that are more resilient to external pressures. This adaptability can also influence Ukraine’s relationships with other countries, potentially leading to stronger alliances and partnerships as the international community recognizes Ukraine’s strength and determination.

Overall, the resilience of Ukrainians is not just a survival mechanism; it’s a powerful force that can shape the future of the country in profound ways.

Chytomo: I feel like saying “Amen” to that! 🙂 

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